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vRÉSUMÉ
Des réseaux intelligents sont des réseaux d’énergie fortement distribués où les technologies
d’énergie et des services sont intégrés avec des informations, des communications et contrô-
lent des technologies. Puisque les sources d’énergie renouvelable deviennent plus efficaces et
rentables, les réseaux intelligents peuvent livrer la puissance propre, durable, sécuritaire, et
fiable aux consommateurs. Cependant, l’utilisation rapide de sources d’énergie renouvelable
provoque des défis techniques en termes de surveillance, le contrôle et la protection des réseaux
électriques. En fait, l’énergie renouvelable implique les phénomènes qui sont naturellement
stochastiques comme la lumière du soleil et le vent. Donc, les réseaux intelligents devraient
être capables de surveiller et répondre aux changements tant dans fournisseur d’énergie que
dans la demande. L’évolution des réseaux électriques provoque aussi le déploiement de nom-
breuses unités de mesure sans précédent et d’intelligents appareils de mesure. En vertu des
systèmes de communications, les signaux en temps réel et les données peuvent être échangés
entre les composants des réseaux intelligents. Le flux de données en temps réel fournit une
occasion unique pour des applications axées sur les données et des outils pour démultiplier
la modernisation de réseaux et la résilience.
Les unités de mesure de phaseur sont les dispositifs spécialisés qui acquièrent le phaseur
synchronisé (synchrophasor) des données des réseaux électriques. L’analytique de données
Synchrophasor peut potentiellement étre plus performant que des méthodes traditionnelles
en termes de prise de décisions. Spécifiquement, l’analytique de données est des approches
qualitatives/quantitatives et les algorithmes qui rassemblent et traitent des données pour en
fin de compte améliorer la conscience situationnelle dans des réseaux électriques. Motivé par
ce fait, cette thèse présente des solutions viables pour l’analytique de données synchrophasor
dans le but d’améliorer la surveillance, le contrôle et la protection de réseaux de distribution.
La thèse se concentre sur trois fonctionnalités qui sont portées de basé sur l’analytique de
données synchrophasor: Détection de perturbation centralisée, surveillance de production
décentralisée (PD) et la protection “backup” coordonnée. L’objectif de surveillance de per-
turbation est de réaliser la détection rapide et fiable de tension/des déviations de fréquence
qui affectent la stabilité de réseau. La surveillance de PD est liée à la détection de la
présence/absence de ressources énergétiques pour la gestion du flux de puissance. La per-
turbation et des outils de surveillance de PD fraient la voie pour la protection adaptative
vi
de secours de réseaux de distribution actifs. Le plan de protection adaptatif de secours as-
sure la stabilité de post-défaut en détectant des défauts de ligne dans un temps de tolérance
permis. La coordination entre le contrôle et des systèmes de protection de secours mène à
la récupération rapide de tension/la fréquence et minimise la panne de courant. L’efficacité
et la fiabilité des méthodes développées et des algorithmes sont validées par des simulations
informatiques vastes basées sur des différents benchmarks.
vii
ABSTRACT
Smart grids are highly distributed energy networks where energy technologies and services
are integrated with information, communications and control technologies. As renewable
energy sources are becoming more efficient and cost–effective, the smart grids can deliver
safe, clean, sustainable and reliable power to consumers. However, the rapid utilization of
renewable energy sources brings about technical challenges in terms of monitoring, control,
and protection of power systems. In fact, renewable energy involves phenomena which are
naturally stochastic such as sunlight and wind. Therefore, the smart grids should be capable
of monitoring and responding to changes in both power supply and demand. The evolution
of the power systems also gives rise to deployment of unprecedented number of measurement
units and smart meters. By virtue of communications systems, real-time signals and data can
be exchanged between components of the smart grids. The flow of real-time data provides
a unique opportunity for data-driven applications and tools to leverage grid modernization
and resiliency.
Phasor measurement units are specialized devices that acquire synchronized phasor (syn-
chrophasor) data from the power systems. Synchrophasor data analytics can potentially
outperform traditional methods in terms of decision making. Specifically, data analytics
are qualitative/quantitative approaches and algorithms that collect and process data to ul-
timately improve situational awareness in the power systems. Motivated by this fact, this
thesis presents viable solutions for synchrophasor data analytics with the aim of improving
monitoring, control and protection of power distribution grids.
The thesis focuses on three functionalities that are carried out based on synchrophasor data
analytics: Centralized disturbance detection, monitoring of distributed generation (DG) sys-
tems, and coordinated backup protection. The objective of disturbance monitoring is to
achieve fast and reliable detection of voltage/frequency deviations that affect the network
stability. The DG monitoring is concerned with detecting presence/absence of energy re-
sources for management of the flow of power. Disturbance and DG monitoring tools pave
the way for adaptive backup protection of active distribution networks. The adaptive backup
protection scheme ensures the post-fault stability by detecting line faults within a permissible
tolerance time. The coordination between control and backup protection systems leads to
fast recovery of voltage/frequency and minimizes power outage. The efficacy and reliability
of the developed methods and algorithms are validated by extensive computer simulations
based on different benchmarks.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
RÉSUMÉ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The Vision for Future Power Grids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Era of Big Data in Smart Grids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Thesis Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5.1 Data Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5.2 Data Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5.3 Control and Protection Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6 Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.7 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CHAPTER 2 A REVIEW ON THE SYNCHROPHASOR TECHNOLOGY . . . . . 11
2.1 Networked Control Methodology in Smart Grids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ix
2.2 Hierarchical and Droop-Based Control in Smart Grids . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Synchrophasor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Synchrophasor Data Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.2 Synchrophasor Data Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Existing Trends and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 Control Methods Based on Data Communications . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2 State Estimation Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.3 Monitoring Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.4 Protection Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.5 Big Data Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CHAPTER 3 CENTRALIZED DISTURBANCE DETECTION . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1.1 Disturbances in Microgrids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1.2 Existing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.4 List of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Synchrophasor Data Acquisition in Smart Microgrids . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.1 Parameter Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.2 Noise-Delay Tradeoff in Synchrophasor Data Acquisition . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Data Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4 Centralized Disturbance Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4.1 Data Concentration Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4.2 Central Disturbance Detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.3 Performance Evaluation of the Central Detector . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5.1 Network Simulation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5.2 Discussion of the Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
xCHAPTER 4 MONITORING OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION SYSTEMS . . . 48
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1.3 List of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Stochastic Analysis of the Phasors of CSC at the Main PCC . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 Secondary Monitoring of Distributed Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3.1 Time-Series Modeling of The Phasors of CSC at the Main PCC . . . 55
4.3.2 Parameter Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3.3 Secondary Monitoring Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3.4 Performance Assessment of the Secondary DG Monitoring . . . . . . 60
4.4 Real-Time DG Event Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.4.1 Local Outliers in Synchrophasor Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.4.2 Localization Based on the Concept of Local Outlier Probability . . . 63
4.5 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5.1 Network Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5.2 Monte Carlo Load Flow Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5.3 Time-Domain Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5.4 Performance Evaluation of Secondary DG Monitoring . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5.5 DG Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
CHAPTER 5 COORDINATED PROTECTION AND SECONDARY CONTROL . 80
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.1.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.1.3 List of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2 Line Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.3 Secondary Control of Islanded Subnetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
xi
5.4 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.4.1 Network Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.4.2 Differentiating Faults From Islanding Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.4.3 Statistical Analysis of Fault Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4.4 Time-Domain Scenario I: Fault Detection by Local Relays . . . . . . 101
5.4.5 Time-Domain Scenario II: Centralized Fault Detection . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.6 Scenario III: Fault in the Presence of Machine-Based DG Systems . . 106
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.1 Thesis Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.2 List of Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.3 Future Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
xii
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 List of symbols in disturbance detection system . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1 List of symbols in DG monitoring system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 The distributions of the per-phase real/reactive powers of loads in dif-
ferent scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1 List of symbols in coordinated protection and control system . . . . . 84
5.2 The values of parameters for centralized fault detection simulations . 98
5.3 The real/reactive powers of inverter-based DG systems under the nor-
mal condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.4 The statistics of reported voltage magnitude data for different types of
faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.5 The statistics of reported frequency data for different types of faults . 101
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Different technologies involved in smart and modern power grids . . . 1
1.2 The functional block diagram of the proposed data processing framework 6
2.1 The three levels of the hierarchical control structure . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 The generic architecture of synchrophasor networks . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 The extraction of synchrophasor data packets in power systems . . . 16
3.1 Disturbance detection with noisy and intermittent synchrophasor data
[1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 The CDF of the noise in the phase angle data for the positive-sequence
component reported by the UTSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 The autocorrelation of the noise in frequency data estimated by the
UTSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Noise-delay tradeoff in the acquisition of frequency data: σ2l = 0.05,
Fs = 900 samples/sec and τp = 20 msec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 A snapshot of spatial interpolation under a ramp of system frequency
for a microgrid with 4 PMUs. The circles indicate interpolated data
samples [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6 The single-line schematic of a microgrid with a radial structure and
residential loads [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.7 Cases of fast (solid curves) and slow (dashed curves) detection under
packet dropouts. (a): The normalized sum of deviations, (b): The
detected state [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.8 Probability of false detection in the central detection [1] . . . . . . . 44
3.9 Probability of false detection in the local detection [1] . . . . . . . . . 44
3.10 Performance comparison of interpolative and recursive PDC algorithms,
Γf = 0.5 Hz, input SNR = 19 dB [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.11 Probability of false detection vs. average detection time: σ2l = −19
dB, pd,l = 10% [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
xiv
3.12 The average detection time vs. packet dropout rate, Γf = 0.1 Hz,
ΓA = 0.1 pu, input SNR = 16 dB [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 The concept of secondary monitoring and control by the MGCC in the
hierarchical control structure [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 An illustration of ambiguity in localization for a radial microgrid with
NPMU = 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 The single-line diagram of the test microgrid and the locations of DG
systems and monitoring PMUs [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4 The simulated (dashed curves) and theoretical (solid curves) CDFs of
In,r(k) at the main PCC [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5 The per-phase real powers generated by DG systems in the period of
one day: (a) Sunny day (b) Cloudy day [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.6 DG monitoring over the time in the unbalanced scenario with the low
variability profile: R = 10−2I, N = 120, Γ = 4 [2] . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.7 DG monitoring over the time in the unbalanced scenario with the high
variability profile: R = 10−4I, N = 120, Γ = 4 [2] . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.8 DG monitoring over the time in the unbalanced scenario with the high
variability profile: R = 10−2I, N = 120, Γ = 4 [2] . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.9 The probability of false detection vs. the size of estimation dataset:
Unbalanced scenario with the high variability profile, R = 10−2I [2] . 75
4.10 The probability of non-detection vs. the size of estimation dataset:
Unbalanced scenario with the high variability profile, R = 10−3I [2] . 75
4.11 The efficiency of the monitoring algorithm as a function of the deviation
coefficient: Sunny day, R = 10−2I, N = 180 [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.12 The efficiency of the monitoring algorithm as a function of the deviation
coefficient: Unbalanced scenario with the high variability profile, R =
10−3I, N = 180 [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.13 The LOPs for different observation nodes after disconnection of DG
system 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.14 The values of LOP vs. time for the observation node b3 . . . . . . . . 78
4.15 The comparison between the LOPs of different observation nodes: λ = 3 79
xv
5.1 The concept of coordinated protection and control based on synchropha-
sor data processing in distribution grids [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2 An example of formation of subnetworks due to a fault between buses
b0 and b2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.3 The flowchart of centralized fault identification [3] . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4 Single-phase model of the edge (bl, bm): Zl and Zm are the line impedances,
Zx,l,m denotes the load impedance [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5 The IEEE 34-bus distribution network with DG systems, circuit break-
ers, and distributed PMUs [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.6 Persistent disturbance in the frequency data when the entire network
becomes isolated from the utility grid at time t = 1 sec. (a): The mean
frequency deviation, (b): The frequency disturbance counter, (c): The
instantaneous range of frequency data [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.7 Incongruous disturbances in the frequency data when a three-phase
fault occurs between nodes b2 and b3 at time t = 1 sec. (a): The mean
frequency deviation, (b): The frequency disturbance counter, (c): The
instantaneous range of frequency data [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.8 The Frequency data of three nodes in scenario I [3] . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.9 Temporary disturbance in the frequency data when the network is sub-
ject to line fault in scenario I. (a) The mean frequency deviation, (b)
The frequency disturbance counter [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.10 The voltage waveform of phase A of observation node b16 in scenario
I: (a) τctl,1 = τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 40 msec, (b) τctl,1 = 40, τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 100
msec, with exponential cost factors (c) τctl,1 = 40, τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 100
msec, with unity cost factors ζi = 1 [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.11 The average values of frequency data after isolation of fault in scenario
I: (a) τctl,1 = τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 40 msec, (b) τctl,1 = 40, τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 100
msec, with exponential cost factors (c) τctl,1 = 40, τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 100
msec, with unity cost factors ζi = 1 [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.12 The normalized fault currents in Scenario II: k = kfl [3] . . . . . . . . 106
5.13 Persistent magnitude disturbance in scenario II: (a)-(c) The mean mag-
nitude deviation for phases A-C, (d): The magnitude disturbance counter
for phase A [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
xvi
5.14 The voltage waveform of phase B of observation node b13 in scenario
II: (a) With unity cost factors ζi = 1, (b) With exponential cost factors
given by (5.21) [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.15 The post-fault apparent powers for phase B at different DG systems in
Scenario II [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.16 The magnitude data reported from phase A of the node b10 in Scenario
III: (a) Detection by over-current relays with tolerance time Tfl = 200
msec (b) Centralized detection with tolerance time Tfl = 30 msec [3] . 109
xvii
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AC Alternating Current
ADN Active Distribution Network
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
DC Direct Current
DG Distributed Generation
DS Distributed Storage
EMTP ElectroMagnetic Transients Program
EPLL Enhanced Phase Locked Loop
FACTS Flexible AC Transmission System
FPS Frames per Second
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
GPS Global Positioning System
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
LOF Local Outlier Factor
LOP Local Outlier Probability
MGCC Microgrid Central Controller
NaN Not a Number
PCC Point of Common Coupling
PDC Phasor Data Concentrator
PDF Probability Density Function
PLL Phase Locked Loop
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PV Photovoltaic
PLOF Probabilistic Local Outlier Factor
RES Renewable Energy Source
ROCOF Rate of Change of Frequency
SC Secondary Controller
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UTSP Unified Three-phase Signal Processor
VSC Voltage Source Converter
1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Vision for Future Power Grids
In future power grids, a vast number of distributed generation (DG) systems will be deployed
in power grids where renewable energy sources (RESs) such as wind and solar will play an
indispensable role. As illustrated in Fig. 1.1, smart grid is a vision for future power grids that
encompass a broad range of information, communications, control, and energy technologies.
In such power grids, DG, distributed storage (DS) units, and consumers are interconnected
with the power plants and transmission systems through microgrids and active distribution
networks (ADNs). Microgrids and ADNs are advanced power systems which are composed of
DG/DS systems, lines, loads, transformers, metering and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).
These autonomous systems enhance the grid resiliency and mitigate the power outage since
they can supply energy in the absence of the utility grid.
Electric vehicles and smart homes are among the other conspicuous features of modern power
grids. In fact, smart grids will provide the infrastructure necessary for enabling the efficient
use of electric vehicles. Electric vehicles will interact with the utility grids by serving as
mobile DS units, a concept which is called “vehicle-to-grid” in the smart grid terminology.
Smart meters and home energy management systems allow for automated and bidirectional
exchange of information between smart homes and the utility grids. A smart home equipped
with an energy management system facilitates tracking of energy consumption and thus
reduces electricity bills.
Smart Homes Solar Power Generation
Electric Vehicles
Wind Power Generation Grid Monitoring
Power Plants
Transmission and Distribution Systems
Figure 1.1 Different technologies involved in smart and modern power grids
21.2 The Era of Big Data in Smart Grids
In light of advanced control and communication technologies, smart grids are able to provide
consumers with safe, clean, sustainable and reliable energy. However, smart grids, as large-
scale and heterogeneous energy networks, will face challenging issues regarding management,
control, reliability, and power quality. Moreover, time-varying RESs, advanced controllers,
and communication systems give rise to increasing complexity of modern power grids where
the role of information and data analytics is indispensable. It is expected that, with the evo-
lution of power systems, planning and operation of grids rely on different types of real-time
and oﬄine data.
As power grids incorporate more RESs, an unprecedented number of sensors, controllers, and
actuators will inevitably emerge in the grid. A sensor can be envisaged as a device/system
which provides specific types of data/information depending on the desired functionality. In
the context of smart grid, most of the sensors belong to the following categories:
• Phasor measurement units (PMUs)
• Phasor data concentrators (PDCs)
• IEDs and protective relays
• Frequency disturbance recorders (FDRs)
• Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
• Smart meters
• Geographic information systems
• Weather forecast data
• Electricity market information
An actuator which is responsible for applying a control action, can be thought of as a switch,
protective device, DG system, DS unit, etc. Moreover, the sensors, the controllers and the
actuators can be spatially separated and thus communication systems are required for trans-
fer of the measurements, signals, and control data.
Among the aforementioned categories, PMUs and PDCs are generally regarded as high-rate
sources of data in power grids. These devices can provide samples of voltage/current phasors,
3instantaneous frequency, real/reactive power, and other pertinent data in real-time. It turns
out that deployment of such devices leads to a large variety of data at a high granularity and
volume: a fact which ultimately brings about the concept of Big Data in power grids. Big
data in power grids can be characterized by three remarkable features:
• Large volume: extended time horizon for processing and archiving data, mainly due to
extensive deployment of high-rate sensors such as PMUs, PDCs, and smart meters
• High velocity: faster temporal variations, mainly due to time-varying RESs and high
penetration of DG systems
• Increasing variety: Different types of data stem from many sensors/sources that did
not exist in conventional power grids
In the era of big data, data-driven applications and tools play a crucial role for a modern-
ized, reliable, and secure operation of power grids. Data-driven approaches improve decision
making and can potentially outperform traditional model-based tools. Motivated by this
fact, the focus of this thesis is on data analytics and data-driven approaches with the aim of
improving situational awareness in modern power grids.
1.3 Statement of the Problem
In 2011, the president of North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) wrote to
the members [4]:
“Almost all of the major network failures, excluding those emanating from severe weather
conditions, have malfunctioning of relays or automatic control systems as a factor that con-
tributes to the aggravation of the failure. Relays may operate when not needed, or fail to
operate when needed for several reasons. Generally speaking, relays may fail to operate
correctly due to incorrect settings, bad coordination with other devices, ineffective commis-
sioning and maintenance, failure of communications channels, or power supplies.”
Basically, data-driven applications rely on exchange of information/data between different
devices and power system components. Therefore, it is important to account for possible
impairments that may be imposed on data during data acquisition and transmission. Noise,
delay, and unpredictable loss of data are deemed to be the harmful impairments that deteri-
orate the performance of the data-driven applications. Such impairments in data may stem
from the following phenomena:
• Imperfect or defective communication devices
4• Congestion and severe background traffic in shared communication links
• Sensor failures
• Measurement noise
• Interference caused by lightning, harmonics and subharmonics
Such data impairments increase uncertainty in information and have deleterious effects on
the reliability and robustness of the aforementioned applications. Therefore, use of a reliable
and accurate data processing framework is deemed to be indispensable for these real-time
applications. In this regard, lack of an elaborate data processing framework tailored to smart
distribution grids is noticeable. The challenge is that real-time algorithms and mechanisms
are required that collect, analyze, and transform real-time data with the primary goal of
reliable decision making. The methods and algorithms not only should cope with noisy,
delayed and intermittent arrival of information but also they should improve performance of
data-driven control and protection applications.
1.4 Thesis Objectives
With the availability of low-cost and accurate measurement devices along with fast and
efficient processors, it is anticipated that new control and protection applications will be
developed for future power grids. There is no doubt that the performance of these applica-
tions depends on how the data are obtained and processed in real-time. Here an important
question arises: Can a data processing framework improve control and protection of modern
distribution grids while being able to coexist with conventional systems?
The main objective of this thesis is to develop algorithms and mechanisms for synchrophasor
data acquisition/processing tailored to monitoring, control and protection applications in
smart microgrids and ADNs. The data acquisition and processing tasks are analyzed under
noisy and intermittent data conditions when developing disturbance monitoring structure.
The other objective of this thesis is the analysis of fault/event detection in the presence of
synchrophasor data delays. The data acquisition task deals with methods and protocols for
extraction of information and transmission to a centralized control unit. If carefully designed,
it can also diminish the deleterious impacts of data impairments. The data processing task,
however, corresponds with algorithms for detection, monitoring, and decision making. More-
over, qualified performance metrics are required in order to evaluate reliability and efficiency
of the proposed methods and mechanisms for control and protection purposes.
5The primary outcome of this study is a reliable and effective data processing framework to
assist control and protection applications in smart microgrids and ADNs. Among the other
objectives of this thesis are data-driven methods that yield:
• More resilient ADNs
• Enhanced automation and planning of power systems
• Ease of network reconfiguration and resource management
• Improved situational awareness
• More reliable smart grid infrastructure
Ultimately, the resulting data-driven methods leverage reliable and secure operation of power
grids that widely utilize DG technology and RESs. The end users of the proposed data
processing framework can be high-level controllers, protection systems, monitoring systems,
and even operators of the utility grid.
1.5 Methodology
A reliable data processing framework paves the way for a broad range of applications from
resource management and economic operation to situational awareness in modern power
systems. At the system level, our proposed data processing framework relies on:
1. Distributed sources of data
2. Hierarchical control and protection structure
3. Time-critical event detection
Distributed data acquisition is accomplished by using communication systems and measure-
ment devices in the smart grid infrastructure. The measurement diversity is achieved by col-
lecting necessary information from several nodes. The measurement diversity improves the
robustness of monitoring applications against unpredictable loss of data by taking advantage
of spatial and temporal correlations inherent in large datasets. Information transmission
reduces reconfiguration cost and maintenance time, hence, the investment in new metering
devices and communication systems can be justified. The hierarchical structure is a promis-
ing paradigm for systematic control and protection of different components in large-scale
power systems. The hierarchical structure also facilitates scalability of the data processing
by designating computational tasks to different processors and devices. In this setting, the
low-level applications aid the applications in upper layers in terms of data management and
6processing. Finally, unforeseen events in power systems (e.g., disturbances, faults, etc.) must
be detected and accommodated for in a timely manner due to the fact that control and pro-
tective actions are essentially time-critical.
Fig. 1.2 illustrates the adopted methodology in this study. As shown in this figure, the
developed data processing framework consists of three functionalities: Data acquisition, data
analytics, and data-driven applications. These constituent functionalities will be discussed
later in the next subsections.
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Figure 1.2 The functional block diagram of the proposed data processing framework
Extensive time-domain and statistical computer simulations are required to investigate the
applicability of the aforementioned data analytics. The computer simulations mostly involve
system-level simulations where very detailed implementation of power system components
are not necessarily helpful. In this study, Electro-Magnetic Transients Program (EMTP-RV)
[5] and Simulink [6] are used for simulating the electrical part of the grid and the PMUs.
The extracted signals and PMU data are then fed to MATLAB modules for analysis of
datasets. The MATLAB modules may also simulate some data impairments, e.g., data noise
and random data losses. The superiority of the developed data processing framework can be
demonstrated by numerical assessment of the performance metrics.
1.5.1 Data Acquisition
Data, signals, and behavioral messages are extracted from different nodes in the micro-
grid/ADN. In this research, the primary sources of data include PMUs, IEDs, and smart
7meters. The PMU data (also referred to as synchrophasor data) are usually streamed to a
PDC (within a central unit) with a fixed reporting rate. The IED data and other protective
messages are exchanged if either an event is locally detected or a request message from an
upper layer unit is received. The smart meter data which carry useful information about
real-time power consumption are also collected in fixed periods.
At the central unit, the PMU data streams are collected and pre-processed. The PMU data
streams should be archived since decision making algorithms may require access to past data.
Moreover, the received data can be decimated in order to meet the sampling requirement of
specific control and protection applications.
1.5.2 Data Analytics
In the context of this thesis, data analytics refers to qualitative/quantitative techniques
and algorithms that improve performance of hierarchical control and protection applications.
Centralized disturbance detection, monitoring of DG connection/disconnection events, and
fault identification are the main functionalities that can be carried out based on data analyt-
ics. Microgrids and ADNs are subject to network-wide disturbances such as voltage/frequency
deviations when they become isolated from the utility grid. Local and droop-based controllers
may fail in suppressing such disturbances. The data processing algorithms should reliably
detect such deviations and trigger a restoration process if necessary. In order to evaluate de-
tection of subtle deviations, it is crucial to assess the performance of disturbance monitoring
under noisy and intermittent data conditions.
The presence and absence of DG systems in distribution networks can change over the time.
In practice, a DG system may become disconnected from the rest of the network due to,
for example, a temporary fault, and then reconnect with the network. The data processing
algorithms should identify how many DG systems are actually operational and determine the
location of DG connection/disconnection events within the network. Moreover, the presence
and absence of DG systems and loads can affect the interval during which a line fault can be
tolerated without compromising the post-fault stability of voltage/frequency. Hence, data
analysis method should be devised to ensure that all faults are reliably detected and isolated
in a permissible time.
1.5.3 Control and Protection Applications
The previously mentioned data analytics can substantially improve performance of control
and protection applications in smart microgrids and ADNs. They not only facilitate opti-
8mal/economic operation but also enhance the performance of secondary/tertiary control, and
increase reliability of grid protection.
Once a network-wide disturbance is detected, a decision making algorithm verifies the sources
of disturbances. If an islanding event is confirmed as the source of the disturbance, then the
secondary control application can trigger the voltage/frequency control mode. Islanding
events can be confirmed by using remote methods which are based on communications be-
tween microgrid and the utility grid. Remote methods monitor the status of circuit breakers
immediately. Remote methods present small or even zero non-detection zone and have no
impact on the power quality. Remote methods are very effective in multiple-inverter systems,
but they need large investment and may not be economic in small systems. If a steady-state
disturbance is observed while the network operates under the islanded mode, then the sec-
ondary control application updates the reference values of voltage/frequency based on the
droop-based control concept.
Once a DG disconnection/connection event is detected, a DG management mechanism de-
termines new setpoints of operational DG systems and updates the values of fault tolerance
time. A backup protection mechanism constantly supervises local protection systems. It
clears line faults if local protective devices fail in detecting faults within the permissible
time. Moreover, as depicted in Fig. 1.2, the DG management mechanism must be synchro-
nized with the backup protection mechanism. The fault clearance entails abrupt changes
in the network topology that directly affect both local and secondary control applications.
Therefore, coordination between DG management and protection mechanisms is important.
1.6 Thesis Contributions
The smart grid reliability and resiliency can be improved by utilizing data-driven control and
protection application. Moreover, such applications depend on a framework to obtain and
process different types of data about real-time behavior of the power system. This is a big
challenge since the data processing framework interacts with different integrated technolo-
gies including communications, control, generation, and storage systems. To overcome this
challenge, the focus of this thesis is on developing a novel data processing framework that
improves decision making for intelligent control and protection applications. The preeminent
contributions of this thesis are effective data analytics including:
1) Detection of network-wide voltage/frequency disturbances [1]. Unlike conventional mon-
itoring systems, our proposed approach relies on several PMUs in order to detect subtle
9disturbances as fast and reliable as possible. In particular, detection time and probability of
false alarm are analyzed under noisy and intermittent synchrophasor data conditions. This
contribution increases accuracy of voltage/frequency monitoring and is useful for bumpless
transfer to islanded mode. It is also important for centralized control when the network is in
the islanded operation mode.
2) Detection of presence/absence of DG systems and localization of connection/disconnection
events within the network [2], [7]. DG systems are important resources in microgrids and
ADNs and their presence/absence may change over the time. We propose an online detection
mechanism that relies on current symmetrical components reported from the main point of
common coupling in order to estimate the number of operational DG systems. This contri-
bution is not only conducive to secondary control functionalities but also vital for reliable
operation of backup protection applications.
3) Adaptive Backup protection coordinated with centralized DG management [3]. The in-
creasing penetration of DG systems may significantly change the short-circuit currents. This
phenomenon adversely affects the performance of line protection systems that operate based
on over-current relaying concept. We propose a method that detects line faults within the
per-determined tolerance time which is crucial for successful backup protection. Since the
connection/disconnection of DG systems are tracked over the time, the secondary controller
is able to update the critical value of fault isolation time. Hence, using our approach, the
post-fault stability of islanded zone is assured. Moreover, upon fault isolation, the central
controller updates the setpoints of DG systems in order to facilitate voltage/frequency re-
covery in the islanded zone.
1.7 Thesis Outline
This thesis includes six chapters which are briefly explained in the sequel:
• CHAPTER 1: Introduction: This chapter introduces the smart grid technology and
explains how data-driven control and protection applications emerge in modern power
grids. Moreover, an overview of the objectives, proposed methods and contributions of
this thesis is given in this chapter.
• CHAPTER 2: A review on the synchrophasor technology: The second chapter is dedi-
cated to the components of synchrophasor networks and hierarchical control systems in
smart grids. Moreover, Chapter 2 reviews existing methods that address power system
state-estimation, monitoring, and protection based on synchrophasor data.
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• CHAPTER 3: Centralized disturbance detection: This chapter addresses reliable de-
tection of voltage/frequency disturbances based on processing of noisy synchrophasor
data that are subject to delay. Noise-delay tradeoff in synchrophasor data acquisi-
tion is explained, and average detection time and probability of false detections are
numerically evaluated.
• CHAPTER 4: Monitoring of DG systems: Detection methods for estimation of the
number of operational DG systems and localization of DG connection/disconnection
events are developed in Chapter 4. The secondary DG monitoring unit processes the
datasets of current symmetrical components at the main PCC and local nodes of the
network. The robustness of the monitoring approach is evaluated in the presence of
solar energy variations and sudden load changes.
• CHAPTER 5: Coordinated protection and secondary control: Detection of line faults
within the critical fault tolerance time is the main subject of this chapter. The fault
detection triggers a decision making algorithm that finds the optimal setpoints of DG
systems for the islanded operation. The response time of the protective devices, DG
capacities, and the communications delays are taken into account in the simulations.
• CHAPTER 6: Conclusion and recommendations: The last chapter presents a summary
of the results and important remarks which can be drawn from this PhD thesis. Chapter
6 ends with suggestion of new research topics that can be addressed in future studies.
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CHAPTER 2 A REVIEW ON THE SYNCHROPHASOR TECHNOLOGY
Microgrids and ADNs are the key elements of a modern power grid. Such networks are in-
herently exposed to diverse operating conditions due to prevalence of DG systems and DS
units [8]. One of the major issues regarding the operation of microgrids and ADNs with high
penetration of RESs is related to the voltage/frequency control and power flow management
[9]. For instance, the variability of photovoltaic (PV) generation results in voltage fluctu-
ations which can be detrimental to voltage regulation in distribution networks. To achieve
reliable and secure operation in smart grids, new and sophisticated infrastructures have been
proposed [10]. In fact, by employing communication and intelligent control systems, modern
distribution networks can effectively harness RESs to improve the network performance in
terms of power quality, reliability, efficiency, cost, and sustainability. In this section, we first
briefly review the recent contributions to the field of intelligent and hierarchical control in
modern power systems. Then, we proceed by discussing synchrophasor networks and how
synchrophasor data play a pivotal role in high-level control and protection applications.
2.1 Networked Control Methodology in Smart Grids
Networked control in smart grids relies on digital communication systems for transfer of in-
formation and control signals between different components of the power system. Networked
control methodology offers several advantages and is gaining a broad range of applications
in smart grids. For example, information can be easily shared among multiple distributed
controllers and different monitoring systems [11]. Moreover, new sensors and actuators can
be easily augmented to the power system. Above all, the configuration and maintenance
costs can be significantly reduced.
It is worth noting that, the interconnection of digital communication systems to the con-
trol and power systems results in new challenges. The digital communication systems are
inherently discrete, i.e., signals must be measured, quantized, and transmitted over communi-
cation links. The communication links have limited and costly capacity, and if the number of
nodes increases, then the communication links may fail in delivering the critical information.
Furthermore, digital communication systems may induce packet delay and packet losses.
2.2 Hierarchical and Droop-Based Control in Smart Grids
The union for the coordination of transmission of electricity (UCTE) has developed a hier-
archical structure for control of large-scale power systems [12]. In modern power systems,
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the hierarchical structure is regraded as an effective paradigm for control of power system
components [13, 12]. Moreover, attempts are made toward standardization of this control
structure for smart grids with high penetration of DG systems [14].
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Figure 2.1 The three levels of the hierarchical control structure
Fig. 2.1 illustrates the general schematic of hierarchical control framework. As shown in
this figure, most of the power system studies consider three levels for hierarchical control
of microgrids and ADNs. A communications network is required for transfer of the control
signals and data between different layers. It should be highlighted that, the control and
protection applications at the higher layers do not necessarily require high-rate data. At the
primary level of this structure, local (also known as primary) controllers are responsible for
decentralized control of current/power or voltage/frequency [15]. To this aim, each operating
DG system requires high-rate information about the instantaneous voltage and current at its
local point of common coupling (PCC) [16, 14].
When connecting two or more DG systems to the network, the DG systems should use the
well-known P/Q droop control method to mimic the behavior of synchronous generators
and supply the time-varying loads. In droop control with inductive lines, the relationships
between real/reactive powers and voltage/frequency are determined by [13]
ωo = ω∗ −KP (s)(Po − P ∗) (2.1)
Vo = V ∗ −KQ(s)(Qo −Q∗) (2.2)
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where ω∗ and V ∗ denote the reference values for frequency and voltage amplitude, respec-
tively. ωo and Vo correspond to the measured frequency and voltage amplitude of the DG
system, respectively. Po and Qo are the measured real and reactive powers, while P ∗ and
Q∗ are their reference values, respectively. The parameters KP (s) and KQ(s) are the droop
transfer functions that can be designed based on the control-synthesis techniques and the
steady-state performance criteria. In their simplest form, the droop transfer functions be-
come constant gains that keep the entire system within the voltage-stability limits [14].
At the second layer of the hierarchical structure, a secondary controller is responsible for
the reliable and economical operation of entire network in either grid-connected or islanded
mode. The secondary controller also performs power sharing, power management, and Load
shedding. If the network under study is a microgrid, then the secondary controller may be
called microgrid central controller (MGCC). When a new DG system is connected to a node
or a malfunctioning unit is disconnected from the network, the primary control level may fail
in controlling the frequency/voltage thus the overall microgrid is disturbed [16]. Moreover,
if the load’s real and reactive powers change, then the amplitude and frequency at the local
PCCs will deviate from their reference values. For example, Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) indicate
that a change in the local load results in steady deviations in the output frequency and volt-
age amplitude. Therefore, the secondary controller must monitor and restore such deviations
by sending new values of ω∗ and V ∗ to DG systems. Throughout this thesis, the point of
connection of DG systems is called a local PCC. Power sharing between several DG units is
another important functionality of the secondary controller [13]. To this aim, the secondary
controller should determine and send the values of P ∗ and Q∗ based on the capacities and
rated powers of DG systems. Finally, it is worth noting that similar functionalities regarding
control of DS units can be assigned to the secondary controller.
At the highest level of the hierarchical structure, the tertiary control layer regulates the power
flow between the microgrid and the utility grid at the main PCC [12]. Moreover, a tertiary
controller is responsible for coordination between multiple microgrids interacting with each
other within an ADN [13]. The tertiary controller can also determine the optimal operating
points of microgrids depending on the requirements of the utility grid.
It should be noted that the primary controllers are designed to operate instantaneously and in
a decentralized manner. While the primary control layer does not require any communication
link, the second and third control layers are inherently based on communication links and
operate similar to networked control methods. The main advantage of hierarchical control is
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improved robustness against disturbances and load changes which may not be settled by the
local controllers.
Time synchronization is of crucial importance in proper operation of hierarchical control
and protection applications. In realistic scenarios, the controllers receive the samples of
voltage/frequency from distributed local PCCs. As a consequence of communication impair-
ments, these information may arrive at a high-level controller without order or with unequal
time delays. In many real-time applications such as disturbance and fault detection, the de-
viation of a parameter from the desired value is important for decision making. This implies
that, the hierarchical control and protection applications requires synchronized (time-aligned)
data that are comparable over the entire network domain. Such synchronized information
can be extracted based on global positioning system (GPS) clock signals as will be discussed
later in this chapter.
2.3 Synchrophasor Networks
Basically, synchrophasor networks consist of three fundamental components [17]:
1. Phasor measurement unit (PMU): for synchronized extraction of voltage/current pha-
sors and other relevant information
2. Phasor data concentrator (PDC): for effective collection, pre-processing, and manage-
ment of synchrophasor datasets
3. Communication links: for transfer of synchrophasor data packets
Fig. 2.2 illustrates the generic architecture of synchrophasor networks. In the data acqui-
sition layer, the PMUs extract synchrophasor data at distributed nodes in the grid. The
synchrophasor data are then delivered to PDCs which facilitate data management by col-
lecting different data streams and constructing synchrophasor datasets. Finally, the PDCs
provide the synchrophasor datasets for different applications in the application layer.
Currently, cost is the main issue that affects widespread deployment of synchrophaosr net-
works in power systems. The cost of the installation, commissioning, and the communication
infrastructure are important economical factors. Substations that are equipped with digital
relays or IEDs already have the necessary communication backbone. Moreover, the IEC
61850 standard allows transfer of synchrophasor data via the same protocols and messaging
structure that handle IED information [18]. As the cost of PMUs decreases and more IEDs
15
are being deployed in power systems we anticipate a gradual migration towards full utiliza-
tion of synchrophasor networks in power grids.
As far as distribution networks are concerned, low-cost and high-precision PMUs, also known
as micro-PMUs, have been commercialized in the recent years. This type of PMU is suitable
for distributed phasor data acquisition at the distribution level due to precise measurements
and highly accurate time stamps [19, 20, 21]. The size of circuit boards in micro-PMUs is
very small and they can be installed in almost every bus of distribution grids. A micro-PMU
is capable of measuring voltage/current phase angles with a resolution of 0.001 deg, and mag-
nitudes with a resolution of 0.0002%. State-of-the-art micro-PMUs can report synchrophasor
data up to 120 frames/sec which makes them a qualified candidate for modern intelligent
protection systems [22].
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Figure 2.2 The generic architecture of synchrophasor networks
2.3.1 Synchrophasor Data Acquisition
It is known that the hierarchical control applications require time-aligned data for proper
decision making. With the advent of reliable and accurate PMUs [23], a feasible data ac-
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Figure 2.3 The extraction of synchrophasor data packets in power systems
quisition method is to locally measure the voltage/current phasors and then transmit the
extracted data to the high-level applications. According to the IEEE standard C37.118-2011
[24], PMU is a device which extracts phasor magnitude, phase angle, frequency, and rate of
change frequency (ROCOF) from the signals given at its input terminal, as illustrated in Fig.
2.3. The PMUs are equipped with transmitters which send the synchrophasor data packets
to the desired destination via communication links.
In light of precise time stamps provided by PMUs, control, monitoring, and protection appli-
cations have access to synchronized and comparable data streams in real-time [23]. Commer-
cial PMUs support a broad range of reporting rate, from 10 reports/sec up to 240 reports/sec
for 60 Hz power systems [24]. The core of any PMU is a parameter estimator which extracts
the synchrophasor data. The electrical signals appearing at the input terminals of PMUs
may become corrupted by harmonics and additive noises. Hence, due to presence of noise
in the input signals, the reported synchrophasor data may carry noisy values of the true
parameters. The accuracy of synchrophasr data is thus dependent on the performance of
the parameter estimator and the noise level. In what follows, we briefly review some of the
techniques that are commonly used for parameter estimation:
• Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) [25, 26]: The fast Fourier transform (FFT) applies
to a window of input signal samples. Depending on the sampling frequency and length
of the window, DFT-based algorithms are classified into fractional-cycle, one-cycle, and
multi-cycle methods. The accuracy of DFT-based methods is liable errors emanated
from aliasing and spectral leakage.
• Phase-Locked Loop (PLL) [27], [28]: Synchronous reference-frame phase-locked loop
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(SRF-PLL), also known as dq0-PLL, is widely used for estimation of magnitude, fre-
quency and phase angle of the positive sequence component of three-phase signals.
Three independent enhanced PLLs (EPLLs) are required to estimate phasors of each
phase of the three-phase signals. The accuracy of PLL-based methods can be affected
by the presence of dc component, severe unbalancedness, and magnitude uncertainty
in the input signals.
• Unified Three-phase Signal Processor (UTSP) [29]: The UTSP is basically an enhanced
three-phase PLL which not only estimates the phasors and frequency of the sequence
components but also synthesizes the signals in the time-domain. Similar to other PLL-
based techniques, the UTSP shows longer transient times than those based on the DFT.
However, the UTSP shows very good robustness against the measurement noise.
• Kalman Filter [30]: Basically, a Kalman filter can be configured to estimate the phasors
similar to DFT-based methods. An adaptive Kalman filtering approach, also referred to
as extended Kalman filter, however, depends on accurate frequency estimation. It can
be thought of as a filter bank with arbitrary center frequencies. The main advantage
of this approach is that it can effectively track the fundamental frequency along with
its harmonics and specified inter-harmonics.
It is worth noting that, the aforementioned techniques differ in terms of robustness against
measurement noise, response time, and computational aspects. Apart from the above meth-
ods, other techniques such as wavelet-based algorithms [31], signal subspace and adaptive
filtering methods [32, 33] can be found in the literature.
2.3.2 Synchrophasor Data Communications
The IEEE standard C37.118.1-2011 defines a data frame as a set of phasor, frequency, and
ROCOF samples that correspond to the same measurement time tag [24]. The reporting
rate of synchrophasor data by PMUs is usually measured in frames per second (fps). The
reporting rate is usually much smaller than the internal sampling rate of voltage/current
waveforms. Therefore, a downsampling and delay compensation is normally required before
transmission of data frames via communication links. There are two common protocols that
may be used in synchrophasor data communication: transport layer protocol (TCP) and user
datagram protocol (UDP).
In realistic scenarios, smart grids need effective mechanisms and protocols in order to ensure
reliable data transmission and handling. The IEEE standards C37.118.2-2011 and C37.244-
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2013 aim to address some issues regarding synchronization, processing, and real-time access to
phasor data streams [34, 35]. These standards also define PDC as a unit that gathers phasor
data, time stamps and other parameters from several PMUs (or other PDCs), and transmits
the collected data to other devices. According to the this definition, a PDC can be thought
of as an elaborate algorithm which can be integrated into other devices. In addition to data
concentration, a PDC may fulfill other objectives such as data archiving, conditioning and
validation [36]. PDCs are particularly helpful in intelligent applications such as situational
awareness. In this study, we elaborate on PDCs as powerful data pre-processing tools for
intelligent and hierarchical control/protection applications in smart grids.
2.4 Existing Trends and Applications
This section discusses some of the recent control and protection methods that rely on syn-
chrophasor data processing. The existing methods are concisely reviewed from the perspective
of high-level control and protection applications that are pertinent to this research.
2.4.1 Control Methods Based on Data Communications
Zheng et al. propose a centralized networked controller for a power system with parallel DG
units connected with a single load [37]. They only consider the impact of communication
delay in transferring the measured voltage and the reference values. The proposed schemes
are applicable to scenarios where all inverters have access to a common communication link,
hence, spatially distributed inverters are not considered.
The authors in [38] propose a robust networked control scheme that complies with the hier-
archical structure. Specifically, they propose a distributed secondary control strategy where
each DG system collects amplitude/frequency data from all operational systems and then
calculates and broadcasts their average values using the communication network. This sec-
ondary control scheme can take into account spatially separated DG systems. However, its
performance is liable to large errors due to DG failures in providing the true information
under measurement noise.
Network control schemes for stabilizing the inter-area oscillations in power systems are dis-
cussed in [39] and [40]. These works only deal with the impact of packet loss on the stability
margin of interconnected power systems. The effect of measurement noise and the procedure
for estimation of power system states are not discussed. Moreover, the application is confined
to oscillatory stability of wide-are power systems.
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Networked control of power systems based on wide area measurements is discussed in [41] and
[42]. The work presented in [41] accounts for the communication delay and packet dropout
and aims to design a robust controller using wide area data as feedback signals. The adverse
effects of limited bandwidth availability on the flexible AC transmission system (FACTS)
controllers are explained in [42]. The underlying idea is to approximate the actual behavior
of power system during the intervals when data from PMUs are not available. However, this
work does not deal with packet loss and communication delays.
The work presented in [43] uses a networked control scheme for accurate and optimized power
sharing in hybrid AC/DC microgrids. In this work, a centralized controller is implemented
in an interconnecting voltage source converter (VSC) in order to optimally exchange power
between the ac and dc sub-grids. The impact of a constant communication delay on the per-
formance of interconnecting VSC is also investigated. However, most of modern networking
technologies are based on packets for data transfer and thus variable communication delays
and random losses are inevitable.
2.4.2 State Estimation Applications
The high reporting rate of PMUs basically allows control applications to effectively estimate
the power system states in real-time. The authors in [44] propose a two-stage Kalman filter-
ing approach for simultaneous estimation of both static and dynamic states in power systems,
i.e., voltage magnitudes/phase angles and generator rotor angles/speeds. They also consider
networked control of multiple inverters which are connected to a common bus and share a
high speed communication link. Moreover, a data analyzer is proposed to determine the
quality of data for power sharing. Specifically, their proposed data analyzer investigates the
communication link failure and the abnormal values of power data. In [45] a distributed state
estimation algorithm is proposed based on information exchanges with immediate neighbor-
ing nodes in large-scale power grids. The proposed state estimation algorithm incorporates
the data obtained by both the SCADA system and PMUs to avoid the observability prob-
lem. Ghahremani and Kamwa propose a decentralized PDC-based state estimation method
of the generators in large-scale power systems [46]. Their Kalman filtering technique pro-
cesses PMU data extracted from the generator buses in order to estimate the rotor angle
and speed of generators. In [47], a PMU-based robust state estimation method is proposed
where synchrophasor data are used as priori information in a modified weighted least square
estimation algorithm.
It is known that, the number of deployed PMUs and their locations in power grids affect the
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observability of static and dynamic states. Finding an optimal PMU placement strategy to
minimize uncertainty in state estimation is addressed by several researchers [48, 49, 50, 51, 52].
The authors in [48] discuss an important trade-off between the accuracy of the state estima-
tion and the number of PMUs/smart meters in distribution grids. The genetic algorithm is
used to solve an optimization problem in order to reach an optimal measurement infrastruc-
ture. The method proposed in [49] is basically a two-stage state estimation scheme which
decomposes state vectors into observable and unobservable parts. A linear estimator receives
PMU measurements to estimate the observable states variables. The resulting estimates are
then used in a reduced-order state estimator to obtain the PMU unobservable state variables.
In [50], a unified method is proposed for finding the minimum number and locations of PMUs
such that all the state variables can be estimated. Their proposed approach yields the least
infrastructure cost while preserves the grid observability. The methodology proposed in [51]
aims at finding the optimal placement for both observability and detection of bad PMU data
in critical measurements. According to their proposed approach, bad data in critical mea-
surements are detected and subsequently converted to non-critical measurements through
appropriate PMU placement. The ultimate advantage of their unified approach is that the
robustness of the state estimation can be improved. In a paper written by Qi et al. [52],
the empirical observability concept is applied to quantify the degree of observability of the
dynamic power system states. The optimal PMU placement is formulated as an optimization
problem which maximizes the determinant of the empirical observability Gramian.
2.4.3 Monitoring Applications
An important aspect of synchrophasor data is related to monitoring applications and sit-
uational awareness in smart grids. In fact, the PMU is deemed to be one of the most
effective measurement devices in power system monitoring. According to the IEEE standard
C37.118.1-2011, two operation classes are defined for PMUs, namely M class and P class.
The M class is usually adopted in applications where high data accuracy is required while
larger delays in data acquisition can be tolerated. Hence, most of monitoring applications
may necessitate hiring PMUs that operate in the M class.
The authors in [53] propose a data-driven method for monitoring of short-term voltage sta-
bility in smart grids. In this approach, the time-series data reported by PMUs are used for
the calculation of finite time Lyapunov exponents. They also address the impact of some
data impairments (such as measurement noise, communication delay, and the length of mea-
surement window) on the stability prediction. In [54], the authors improve the quality of
PMU data by developing a state estimator for high-voltage buses. Their approach relies
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on redundant PMU data in order to compute the power flows for disturbance and stability
monitoring. An effective method for stability margin monitoring is proposed in [55]. In this
method, first the generator angles are measured by PMUs and then then the phase angle
difference between critical buses are calculated. An alarm is issued uppon detection of a
disturbance which may violate the system transient stability.
The paper written by Kaci et al. proposes a comprehensive approach to monitor the power
system stability based on the synchrophasor data streams [56]. Their approach is basically
a data baselining method which relates PMU measurements with the grid performance mea-
sures under normal operating conditions. It combines conventional descriptive statistics with
predictive data mining by means of a big database of power system information. Such a huge
database comprises both load flow and dynamic data which can be collected over a time span
of several years.
2.4.4 Protection Applications
Most of commercially available PMUs can operate according to the P class specifications.
System designers may choose the P class for protection applications where a fast synchropha-
sor reporting is required [57]. A high data rate (which means more information in a shorter
time period) comes at the cost of lower data accuracy. The accuracy of synchrophasor data,
however, is of lower importance in protection applications.
Use of synchrophasor data for protection of power transmission lines is discussed by several
papers [58, 59, 60, 61]. In this class of protection schemes, the main objective is to find the
accurate location of faults independent of fault type/resistance, source impedance, and power
flows. The fault detection and localization for high-voltage parallel transmission lines are well
investigated in the paper written by Chen et al. [58]. They use two PMUs to measure voltage
and current phasors at the two ends of transmission lines. An eigenvalue-based method is
applied to decouple the mutual coupling effects between the parallel lines. The authors also
propose an adaptive line parameter estimation algorithm for transposed and untransposed
parallel lines. They employ ElectroMagnetic Transients Program (EMTP) simulations to
show that their PMU-based protection scheme responds accurately to faults under the ac-
tual power system conditions. The authors in [59] propose a new method for backup distance
protection of transmission lines. Similar to the method given in [58], their method relies on
the use of the voltage and current phasors at both ends of the transmission lines. A system
protection center receives the phasor data and eliminates the infeed effect (which increases
the apparent impedance seen by the distance relays). The numerical results presented in [59]
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show that this backup protection scheme has a good performance with different values of the
fault resistance.
Current differential relaying for protection of transmission lines with PMU data is discussed
in [60]. This paper also analyzes the sensitivity of the differential protection method for dif-
ferent values of fault resistance, location, and inception angle. The authors also evaluate the
impact of communication delay on the performance of the differential protection scheme. An
adaptive backup protection scheme for transmission lines is developed in [61]. In this paper,
the linear least squares method is used to obtain a closed-form and non-iterative solution for
the fault identification problem. The authors also propose an optimization model in order to
minimize the number of required PMUs and alleviate the related issues such as data storage
limitation and communications burden.
Synchrophasor data can also improve wide-area and backup protection in power systems
[62, 63, 64, 65]. The authors in [62] point out that event detection and identification based
on synchrophasor data play an important role in verifying the operation of relays. A fast
variant of discrete S-transform is used for time-frequency analysis of voltage and frequency
data reported by PMUs. Afterward, a set of features are derived from the time-frequency
representation of data that are relevant to the characteristics of disturbances. Finally, the
calculated features are fed into a multi-class extreme learning machine classifier that identifies
the power system disturbances. Zare et al. propose a wide-area backup protection scheme
that relies on communication systems to obtain synchrophasor data over a large power system
[63]. The advantages of the proposed method is that it requires phasors of positive-sequence
and identifies different types of faults under both normal and stressed conditions. The au-
thors have also investigated the effect of communications/PMU failures on the applicability
of their proposed scheme.
Intelligent protection algorithms can process PMU data in order to automatically generate
early alarms before a voltage collapse occurs [64]. In [64], a method is presented for filtering
synchrophasors with the aim of attenuating unwanted perturbations and removing the bad
PMU data. The filtered synchrophasor data are subsequently used to calculate the sensitivity
parameters by differentiating bus voltages with respect to the real/reactive powers transfered
between buses. A warning alarm is generated before these sensitivities abruptly possess a
large positive value (comparison with a threshold).
Hyder et al. [65] put forward a predictive protection framework based on adaptive syn-
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chrophasor data communications. In their proposed framework, the maximum loadability
and voltage instability point of the power system are periodically estimated by employing
synchrophasor data and a curve-fitting technique. The curve fitting technique yields an op-
timization problem which is solved by using a convex programming tool. Moreover, the
authors propose an adaptive scheme in order to dynamically increase the efficiency of com-
munications links. This is achieved by switching between normal and fast data rates based
on the outputs of a predictive algorithm.
2.4.5 Big Data Learning
Widespread usage of PMUs will eventually result in expansion of the volume of data. Dy-
namic phasor data are inherently stochastic, correlated in time and space which indicates
more complexity [66]. It is anticipated that utilities will face challenges in terms of data
management as well as data processing. Big Data in power systems is characterized by:
1) Large volume: extended time horizon for archiving data
2) High velocity: temporal constraints on collecting, processing and analyzing data
3) Increasing variety: data come from many sources that did not exist in conventional grids
Big data technology has been successfully applied to quantum, financial and biological sys-
tems. Data analytics facilitates improved situational awareness and secure grid operation
Powerful data-driven tools are deemed to outperform traditional model-based tools [67]. Ba-
sically, data-driven approaches improve decision making about network disturbances such as
faults, dynamic events, intermittent power from renewable sources, etc.
The authors in [68] review different applications of big data in the energy industry. It is shown
that, big data can enhance the smart grid operation and management at higher levels. The
study presented in [69] reveals that load modeling and load forecasting are two main big data
intelligence applications in smart grids. Load modeling is related to the characterization of
the behavior of different consumers and the grid to achieve optimal power management. Load
forecasting is pertinent to predictions of power exchange in both short and long terms. A
new method based on the random matrix theory is proposed in [70] which enables a feasible
architecture for big data analysis in smart grids. The proposed method is shown to be a
promising tool for anomaly detection in power systems.
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CHAPTER 3 CENTRALIZED DISTURBANCE DETECTION
Modern power systems are shifting toward large scale grids that comprise multitude of in-
terconnected microgrids. A microgrid is a localized system of DG systems, DS units, loads,
and smart measurement devices and is capable of bi-directional exchange of power [71]. Such
active networks give rise to several challenges in regard to control, stability, reliable opera-
tion, and power quality [13]. Moreover, microgrids are prone to issues such as voltage and
frequency disturbances. Detection of such disturbances by control systems is therefore nec-
essary for improving the operation of entire system.
This chapter develops a new structure for the centralized detection of voltage/frequency
disturbances with noisy synchrophasor data that are subject to delay. We first present
the analysis of noise-delay tradeoff in synchrophasor data acquisition, and then develop a
new PDC for compensation of data losses. The performance metrics for the detector are
numerically evaluated in the case of microgrid islanding. The results corroborate that the
proposed structure counteracts the data noise and reduces the disturbance detection time.
Moreover, numerical results show that the proposed algorithm lowers the probability of false
detection and it can achieve the lower bound of average detection time. This study helps
microgrid experts with assessing the performance of synchrophasor networks through which
voltage/frequency disturbances are detected.
3.1 Introduction
The hierarchical control structure is considered as an effective methodology for control of
large-scale power systems with multitude of DG systems and RESs [13]. Local controllers
belong to the first layer of the hierarchical structure and carry out decentralized control of
voltage, current, and frequency [15]. Each DG system requires high rate samples of the
instantaneous voltage, current, and frequency at its local PCC [16, 72]. The MGCC belongs
to the second layer of the hierarchical structure and is responsible for networked control
of microgrid. The advantage of using the MGCC is improved robustness of control system
against disturbances that are settled by the primary layer of the structure. The MGCC
gathers the data from dispersed local PCCs. This means that the MGCC needs synchronized
data that can be extracted using PMUs [24, 34, 73, 23].
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3.1.1 Disturbances in Microgrids
In the context of microgrids, disturbance refers to deviations in voltage or system frequency
which may result in reliability, control or safety issues. Modern microgrids can operate in both
grid-connected and islanded modes. Transitions from the grid-connected mode to the stand-
alone mode is a source of voltage/frequency disturbances [74, 75]. For instance, to assure the
proper operation of the microgrid, the MGCC can supervise DG systems upon detection and
confirmation of islanding. The control commands sent from the MGCC can be a change in
real/reactive power setpoints, disconnection of DG, or switching to another controller [76].
The other type of network-wide disturbances is observed when the microgrid operates in the
islanded mode based on a droop control strategy. In a droop-controlled microgrid, change
of load or generation results in changes in the steady-state values of voltage/frequency [38].
Under such circumstances, the MGCC initiates the restoration process whenever a deviation
in steady-state values of voltage/frequency is detected.
3.1.2 Existing Methods
Applications of phasor data for detection, monitoring and control purposes in power systems
are addressed in the literature, refer to subsection 2.4.3 in Chapter 2 and references [77, 78].
The previous methods attempt to monitor voltage/frequency states and their transitions as-
suming that the synchrophasors are reported from a single node without loss of information
or delays. In real-world microgrids, however, the phasor data are subject to impairments
such as noise and random data losses.
Fast detection of disturbances is vital for time-critical control applications. A shortcoming of
existing methods is that concerns regarding the detection time are not addressed. In fact, they
assume that deviations in the system frequency or voltage can be immediately detected by
the central controller. This implies a detection time equal to zero which may not be plausible
in realistic scenarios. It can be concluded that the centralized disturbance detection using
noisy and intermittent synchrophasor data has not been fully investigated. Monitoring of
voltage/frequency states based on different measurement units invokes a rigorous analysis of
reliability and robustness of the detection process. The MGCC relies on communication links
in order to supervise DG systems in regard to power control and mitigation of disturbances
[71]. Centralized detection of disturbances is achievable at a very low cost as long as the
control structure conforms to a hierarchical form. However, a robust detection mechanism is
required to compensate for data impairments that can potentially affect the secondary and
tertiary levels of the hierarchical structure.
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3.1.3 Contributions
This chapter proposes a new paradigm for reliable detection of voltage/frequency disturbances
with noisy and intermittent synchrophasor data. A data concentration algorithm is proposed
that compensates for data losses in communications between PMUs and the MGCC. This
structure achieves a robust and reliable detection by mitigating the measurement noise which
in turn reduces the probability of false detection. Moreover, the use of multiple PMUs
decreases the average detection time. The islanding of a residential microgrid is simulated to
evaluate the performance of the proposed structure. The simulation results indicate that the
lower bound of average detection time can be achieved for a broad range of packet dropout
rates. This study aids engineers in developing data acquisition systems for reliable and
robust secondary control applications. Centralized control methods in islanded microgrids
depend on fast detection of voltage/frequency deviations. In this chapter, an islanding event
is simulated to create the voltage/frequency disturbances. It should be noted that, islanding
detection is not a goal of this chapter since there is a wealth of islanding detection methods
in the literature [79] and [75]. Moreover, most of the passive islanding detection methods
assume that ideal voltage magnitude/frequency data are available and do not consider loss
of data. Our proposed detector can be envisage as an auxiliary function which sends an
alarm to local islanding detection systems for taking remedial actions. Control functionalities
which restore voltage/frequency of droop-controlled microgrids can also take advantage the
proposed detection structure.
3.1.4 List of Symbols
Table 3.1 lists the symbols and their descriptions which are used throughout this chapter.
3.2 Synchrophasor Data Acquisition in Smart Microgrids
3.2.1 Parameter Estimation
Centralized disturbance detection by means of L PMUs is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The PMUs
estimate phasor parameters at the local PCCs of L DG systems. The variable vl(t) denotes
the voltage signal of the lth local PCC at time t [1]:
vl(t) = Al(t) sin
(
2pif0t+ θl(t)
)
, 1 ≤ l ≤ L, (3.1)
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Table 3.1 List of symbols in disturbance detection system
Symbol Description
t time
k Discrete time index
L Total number of PMUs
f0 Nominal power system frequency
εl(t) Additive noise in the input signals
Fs Sampling rate of analog signals
N Size of window
D Decimation factor
Ft Reporting rate of PMU
w Vector of window coefficients
τp PMU processing time
τp Data acquisition delay
τl,k Communication delay at time index k from lth PMU
rl,k Binary indicator for delivery of data at time k from lth PMU
pd,l Packet drop probability from lth PMU
βx,k Normalized sum of deviation for parameter x at time index k
ζk Binary indicator for the actual state of microgrid
ζ˜k Binary indicator for the detected state of microgrid
Γx Disturbance detection threshold for parameter x
Td Average detection time (overall)
τe Average detection delay (at the controller)
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Figure 3.1 Disturbance detection with noisy and intermittent synchrophasor data [1]
where f0 denotes the nominal power system frequency. This signal is expressed by a phasor
as follows [1]
Vl(t) =
Al(t)√
2
ejθl(t). (3.2)
In general, the PMUs report the measurement time tags along with the estimates of phasor
magnitude, phase angle, frequency, and ROCOF of voltage/current signals. The input sig-
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nals are corrupted by additive noise, which is denoted by εl(t). The generic procedure for
synchronized phasor estimation is also given in Fig. 3.1. A low-pass filtering is applied on the
input signal to attenuate components above the Nyquist frequency of the sampling process.
An analog-to-digital (A/D) converter samples the filtered signal according to the rate Fs
samples/sec. Now, let t = i/Fs, where i = 0, 1, 2, .... The parameter estimator extracts the
phasor magnitude Al,i and the phase angle θl,i which lies in the interval [−pi, pi].
The estimator can be realized using either of the techniques that are explained in subsection
2.3.1. In this chapter, we adopt the UTSP to obtain synchrophasor data. One advantage of
the UTSP is that it can estimate the phasor information with good immunity to noise and
fast response time [29, 80]. The UTSP parameters are seven real positive gains which are
tuned to yield the desired speed of estimation. A detailed design procedure of these gains
are discussed in [29].
Due to presence of the measurement noise in the process of phasor extraction, the phasor
data are noisy versions of the true values. Suppose that, nl,A,i and nl,θ,i represent the additive
noises in the measurement of magnitude and phase angle, respectively. It follows that [1]
Al,i = Al(
i
Fs
) + nl,A,i, θl,i = θl(
i
Fs
) + nl,θ,i. (3.3)
The parameter estimator also extracts the instantaneous frequency, fl,i, and the ROCOF,
δl,i, as [1]
fl(t) = f0 +
1
2pi
d
dt
θl(t), δl(t) =
d
dt
fl(t), (3.4)
and
fl,i = fl(
i
Fs
) + nl,f,i, δl,i = δl(
i
Fs
) + nl,δ,i, (3.5)
where nl,f,i and nl,δ,i are the additive noises in the acquisition of frequency and ROCOF
samples, respectively.
Now assume that sl(t) denotes the vector of the true parameters [1]:
sl(t) = [Al(t) θl(t) fl(t) δl(t)]T (3.6)
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and define the vector of the estimation noise as [1]:
nl,i = [nl,A,i nl,θ,i nl,f,i nl,δ,i]T (3.7)
The output of the phasor estimator is obtained as [1]:
ul,i = [Al,i θl,i fl,i δl,i]T = sl
( i
Fs
)
+ nl,i. (3.8)
Our studies based on the UTSP results and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test verify that the noise
in the output data fits well to the Gaussian distribution. For instance, Fig. 3.2 compares the
empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the noise in estimated phase angle with
the Gaussian CDF. In this figure, the internal sampling rate for the UTSP is Fs = 900 sam-
ples/sec and the input SNR is 20 dB. The theoretical CDF is plotted with mean equal to 0
and standard deviation equal to 2.1 deg. The excellent match between the empirical and the
theoretical CDFs confirms the assumption of Gaussian distribution. Based on the obtained
results, we assume that the elements of the random vectors nl,i follow a Gaussian distribution.
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Figure 3.2 The CDF of the noise in the phase angle data for the positive-sequence component
reported by the UTSP
Windowing and decimation operations are applied on the output of the parameter estimator
to produce a frame of synchrophasor data which is suitable for transmission over communi-
cation links. According to the IEEE standard C37.118.1-2011 [24], a data frame is a set of
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phasor, frequency, and ROCOF samples that are measured at the same measurement times.
Since the sampling rate of input signals is high, the decimator downsamples the extracted
information to decrease the cost of communications. Note that windowing is basically a
low-pass filtering operation that offers several advantages:
• Mitigate the adverse measurement noise
• Attenuating abrupt transients due to interfering signals and sudden switching
• Removing the aliasing effect in the downsampling process
The sample vectors ul,i are filtered by a window of size N + 1. In fact, N + 1 shows the
number of consecutive sample vectors that are used in the windowing process. We assume
that N is even number, hence, the following vector relationship is written [1]
uˆl,i =
1
W
N/2∑
m=−N/2
wm ul,i+m (3.9)
where,
W ,
N/2∑
m=−N/2
wm (3.10)
wm are the real coefficients of the window. The reported time tags must be determined
according to the center of the window, and compensation for any preceding delays is necessary.
The decimated signals are reported to the MGCC at the rate Ft fps. Let D denote the integer
decimation factor, i.e.,
D = Fs/Ft (3.11)
The kth data frame reported by the lth PMU is the vector [1]
yl,k = uˆl,kD, k = 0, 1, 2, ..., 1 ≤ l ≤ L. (3.12)
The coefficients for commonly used windows are given as [81]:
Rectangular: wm =

1, −N/2 ≤ m ≤ N/2
0, o.w.
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Triangular: wm =

1 + 2m
N
, −N/2 ≤ m ≤ 0
1− 2m
N
, 0 ≤ m ≤ N/2
0, o.w.
Hamming: wm =

0.54− 0.46 cos
(
2pim/N + pi
)
, −N/2 ≤ m ≤ N/2
0, o.w.
3.2.2 Noise-Delay Tradeoff in Synchrophasor Data Acquisition
The phasor estimation errors are related to the elements of the vector nl,i. Basically, the
average power of εl(t) directly affects the statistics of the data noise vector. Due to struc-
tural complexity of the parameter estimator, explicit analysis of the statistics of the data
noise is not a mathematically tractable problem. To be more specific, the UTSP includes
several feedback loops which are coupled. Hence, not only the elements of the estimation
noise vector are correlated but also the noise samples (for each parameter) become correlated
in time.
It is crucial to assess the effective noise in synchrophasor data frames. Suppose that the noise
that enters the lth estimator is a white Gaussian noise with zero mean and fixed variance
σ2l . Let nˆl,k represent the effective noise vector (after the windowing) in the kth data frame.
From Eqs. (3.8)-(3.12) it is concluded that [1]
nˆl,k =
1
W
n¯l,kDw, (3.13)
where n¯l,kD is the noise matrix obtained by stacking the estimation noise vectors as [1]:
n¯l,kD = [nl,kD−N/2 · · ·nl,kD · · ·nl,kD+N/2] (3.14)
and w represents the vector of the window coefficients [1]:
w = [w−N/2 · · ·w0 · · ·wN/2]T (3.15)
The correlation matrix of the effective noise is thus expressed as [1]
Rl = E
{
nˆl,knˆTl,k
}
= 1
W 2
E
{
n¯l,kDwwT n¯Tl,kD
}
(3.16)
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If the input noise is stationary within the estimation interval, then the elements of the
matrix Rl does not vary over the time. For the rest of our analysis, the variable x represents
a parameter that belongs to the set P given as [1]:
x ∈ P = {A, θ, f, δ} (3.17)
The autocorrelation of the noise in the generic parameter x is given by [1]
Rl,x(i, j) = E
{
nl,x,inl,x,j
}
(3.18)
The variance of the effective data noise is an important quantity for detection and monitoring
systems. This quantity should be evaluated under the ideal conditions of the power system,
i.e., the input voltage/current signal is not in a disturbed or transient condition. The variance
of the effective noise in each parameter can be assessed by [1]:
σˆ2l,x =
1
W 2
wTwσ2l,x + N/2∑
i=−N/2
i 6=j
N/2∑
j=−N/2
wiwjRl,x(i, j)
 (3.19)
where
σ2l,x = E
{
n2l,x,i
}
(3.20)
represents the noise variance in parameter x at the lth PMU (before windowing). The value
of σ2l,x depends on the input noise variance, σ2l , and the structure of the parameter estimator.
Our studies indicate that, the effective noise in each estimated parameter is correlation q-
dependent [82]. In other words, a positive number q exists which satisfies the following
equation [1]:
Rl,x(i, j) = 0, |i− j| > q, ∀x ∈ P .
The values of q is a function of the internal sampling frequency, Fs. Fig. 3.3 shows an
example of the autocorrelation of noise in frequency data estimated by the UTSP. In this
case, the input is a balanced 60 Hz voltage signal corrupted by Gaussian noise and the in-
ternal sampling rate is Fs = 900 samples/sec. In can be seen that Rl,f (i, j) ≈ 0 for |i−j| > 40.
A prevalent post-estimation filter is realized by a rectangular window with w = 1N+1. As-
suming that a rectangular window with N ≥ q is applied on the estimated parameters Eq.
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Figure 3.3 The autocorrelation of the noise in frequency data estimated by the UTSP
(3.19) yields [1]
σˆ2l,x =
1
N + 1σ
2
l,x +
1
(N + 1)2Kl,x (3.21)
where the constant Kl,x is given by [1]
Kl,x =
q/2∑
i=−q/2
i 6=j
q/2∑
j=−q/2
Rl,x(i, j) (3.22)
Eq. (3.21) shows that the variance of the effective data noise depends on σl,x, N , and the
structure of the estimator (through the parameter Kl,x).
As a result of windowing, a non-trivial group delay is inevitably imposed on the synchrophasor
data. The data acquisition delay is given by [1]
τpmu =
N
2Fs
+ τp. (3.23)
The first term in the above equation indicates the group delay and the second term, τp, is
called the PMU processing time. The PMU processing time involves all pre-estimation delays
emanating from anti-aliasing filtering and the parameter estimator. According to Eq. (3.21)
the variance of the effective noise decreases by a factor 1/(N + 1). Nevertheless, the data
34
acquisition delay is proportional to N . The tradeoff between the variance of the effective noise
and the data delay affects the accuracy and latency of disturbance detection. An example of
the noise-delay tradeoff for frequency data is shown in Fig. 3.4. In this figure, the left and
right vertical axes show the values of the effective noise variance and the data acquisition
delay, respectively.
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Figure 3.4 Noise-delay tradeoff in the acquisition of frequency data: σ2l = 0.05, Fs = 900
samples/sec and τp = 20 msec
3.3 Data Communications
The performance of centralized detection and control applications depends on the service
quality provided by communications networks [38]. In light of PMUs, the phasor information
at distributed nodes can be acquired in a synchronized manner. However, communications
systems may introduce data losses [37] and thus the actual synchrophasor data received by
the PDC/MGCC may be intermittent.
The transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP) [34] are two
common protocols for transmission of data packets. In the TCP, if an erroneous packet is
detected, then the receiver side of the link requests retransmission of the packet. However,
by using the UDP, the erroneous packets are dropped at the receiver side. Therefore, the
subsequent data packets which are waiting for transmission do not tolerate further delays.
Digital communications systems utilize error detection coding, e.g., cyclic redundancy codes,
to identify erroneous data packets [34]. In the TCP, the inevitable delay in the request and
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reply process [83] has adverse effect on time-critical applications. It can be concluded that,
the UDP is an efficient protocol for transmission of data from PMUs to the MGCC, whereas
the TCP is suitable for sending commands to DG systems and local controllers. For the rest
of our analysis, the transmission of synchrophasor data packets is based on the UDP.
The service quality of communications systems can vary over the time. From the vantage
point of detection applications, it usually suffices to model the lth communications link by a
delay variable, τl,k, and a binary variable rl,k (refer to Fig. 3.1). τl,k represents the aggre-
gated communication delay imposed on the kth data packet transmitted from the lth PMU.
The value of τl,k depends on the size of data packets, data rate, channel access time, coding
time, etc. In some practical scenarios a communication medium, e.g., a wireless channel, is
shared among different PMUs. In that case, the total communication delay is affected by the
network congestion, hence, τl,k is a random variable. Detailed characterization of communi-
cation systems is beyond the scope of this thesis. It should be highlighted that by virtue of
time tags provided in synchrophasor networks, the values of rl,k and τl,k can be found by the
MGCC.
The binary random variable rl,k represents delivery of the kth data packet. rl,k = 0 is assigned
to the dropped/erroneous data packet at time index k. The delivered data packet at time
k is associated with rl,k = 1 and is assumed to be error-free. The Bernoulli distribution
characterizes the packet dropouts in communications links [1]:
Pr{rl,k = 0} = pd,l, (3.24)
Pr{rl,k = 1} = 1− pd,l, (3.25)
In (3.25), pd,l shows the probability of packet dropout in the communications between the
lth PMU and the MGCC. This parameter is basically a gauge of the service quality of lossy
communications links.
At the MGCC, first a PDC collects the reported synchrophasor data [35]. Considering delay
requirements of detection and control applications, the PDC is not allowed to wait for a long
time in order to collect data. Under such circumstances, the PDC uses a waiting interval
[34] and constructs a dataset of the data delivered in this interval. A synchrophasor dataset
for time index k is denoted by Y˜k. Y˜k is basically a 4× L matrix formed by concatenation
of synchrophasor data reported by different PMUs.
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As a common practice, the PMUs report their data frames at an integer rate Ft fps. Suppose
that the reporting instants are uniformly spaced over the time. In a one-second period each
PMU reports Ft phasor samples and the transmission of the first sample begins with the
second rollover [24]. The PDC is synchronized with the PMUs and under ideal conditions it
receives L data packets from L PMUs in 1/Ft seconds period. In this regime, the acquisition,
transmission, and collection of data are carried out in a synchronized manner. Therefore,
it is plausible to assume that the PDC waiting time is equal to the interval between two
successive samples, i.e., 1/Ft.
3.4 Centralized Disturbance Detection
3.4.1 Data Concentration Algorithm
Loss of synchrophasor data due to delayed arrival/dropout of data packets should be taken
into account in PDC design. A conventional method is to insert an invalid data indicator (e.g.,
NaN) in place of lost data elements, as declared by the IEEE standard for synchrophasor data
transfer [34]. However, indicators do not facilitate decision making and render conventional
PDCs inefficient for monitoring and detection applications. In light of measurement diversity
provided by multiple PMUs, PDCs can use received data frames to estimate elements of the
lost data frames.
Upon dropout of a data packet from a PMU, parameters x ∈ P for that PMU can be
estimated by the PDC. The set of the received data can be used to reconstruct the lost data.
Suppose that the vector yl,k denotes the data reported at the kth time index [1]:
yl,k = [yl,A,k yl,θ,k yl,f,k yl,δ,k]T (3.26)
and let y˜l,k be the data at the output of the PDC [1]:
y˜l,k = [y˜l,A,k y˜l,θ,k y˜l,f,k y˜l,δ,k]T (3.27)
Algorithm 3.1 explains the procedure of synchrophasor data concentration by assuming that
the PDC waiting time is equal to one reporting interval. Algorithm 3.1 is recursive in terms
of the local information (phasors) but interpolative for the global information (frequency and
ROCOF).
Algorithm 3.1: Interpolative/Recursive Data Concentration [1]:
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1. Construct the set of PMU indices that their data have been received successfully:
Lk ,
{
l | rl,k = 1, τl,k ≤ 1/Ft
}
(3.28)
2. If |Lk| = 0, then proceed to step 3, otherwise go to step 4.
3. Recursive Concentration: Set y˜l,x,k = y˜l,x,k−1, l = 1, 2, ..., L, ∀x ∈ P .
Go to step 1 with time index k + 1.
4. For l = 1, 2, ..., L:
If l ∈ Lk, then set y˜l,x,k = yl,x,k,∀x ∈ P .
If l /∈ Lk, then set y˜l,A,k = y˜l,A,k−1, y˜l,θ,k = y˜l,θ,k−1 proceed to step 5.
5. Interpolative Concentration: For the parameters x ∈ {f, δ}, if σl,x are a priori known,
then use Eq. (3.29), otherwise use Eq. (3.30)∗:
y˜l,x,k =
( ∑
j∈Lk
1/σ2j,x
)−1 ∑
j∈Lk
yj,x,k
σ2j,x
, (3.29)
y˜l,x,k =
1
|Lk|
∑
j∈Lk
yj,x,k, (3.30)
Go to step 1 with time index k + 1.
∗|S| shows the cardinality of the set S.
In Algorithm 3.1, the successfully received data packets are immediately used to construct
the output dataset. In case of a data loss or excessive delay, the unknown phasor ampli-
tude and phase angle are replaced by their most recent samples but the frequency and the
ROCOF are interpolated. Eq. (3.29) is the maximum likelihood estimator of unknown data
while Eq. (3.30) is the arithmetic mean of the received data. In low-voltage and residential
microgrids where the line impedance is both inductive and resistive, the amplitude and phase
angle data may vary among different local PCCs. However, the system frequency and the
ROCOF are independent of the location of PMUs and the line impedance. If all communica-
tions links fail to deliver data packets, then step 3 is carried out that implies a recursive PDC.
In lossy synchrophasor networks where delivery of data can be intermittent, a detector which
employs on an interpolative/recursive PDC is faster than the one which relies a conventional
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PDC. The sample estimators in Algorithm 3.1 also improve the immunity of synchrophasor
datasets to measurement noise and PMU failures. Fig. 3.5 illustrates how sample estimators
are used for extracting the unknown frequency samples. In this figure, only the communica-
tions between the fourth PMU and the PDC encounter packet dropout.
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Figure 3.5 A snapshot of spatial interpolation under a ramp of system frequency for a mi-
crogrid with 4 PMUs. The circles indicate interpolated data samples [1]
3.4.2 Central Disturbance Detector
In general, a disturbance can be envisaged as a perturbation or deviation in phasor/frequency
of local PCCs. As discussed in previous subsections, the synchrophasor data that convey
phasor/frequency deviations undergo impairments over the time. The central detector relies
on real-time datasets (which are produced by Algorithm 3.1) in order to make decision about
the status of the microgrid. For the time index k, the detector finds the normalized sum of
deviations in the parameter of interest [1]:
βx,k =
1
L
L∑
l=1
(y˜l,x,k − x0), (3.31)
In Eq. (3.31), x0 is the nominal value of the parameter x and is known a priori. Suppose
that ζ and ζ˜ are binary variables that represent the true and the detected states of the
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microgrid, respectively. If the microgrid undergoes a network-wide disturbance, then ζ = 1,
otherwise ζ = 0. In detection applications, ζ˜ = 1 indicates that a disturbance is detected
and a secondary control mechanism should be triggered immediately. ζ˜ = 0 shows that the
normal or non-disturbed condition of the microgrid is detected and the secondary control
should not be applied. ζ˜ goes from 0 to 1 whenever the normalized sum of deviations exceeds
a predetermined threshold [1]:
ζ˜k =
 1, if |βx,k| > Γx0, otherwise (3.32)
The threshold Γx in (3.32) shows the normalized deviation in the parameter x beyond which
the microgrid is considered to be disturbed. As will be shown later in this chapter, the central
detector outperforms local detection methods that rely on single PMU data.
3.4.3 Performance Evaluation of the Central Detector
From a monitoring/control perspective it is important to assure fast and accurate detection
of voltage/frequency disturbances. With UDP-based communications, the synchrophasor
networks (including acquisition and transmission) are inherently stochastic. Since data are
subject to random noise, delay, and unpredictable losses, it is necessary to have a statistical
method for performance evaluation of the central detector.
By using stochastic synchrophasor networks, the random detection delay may lead to harmful
transients or even stability issues. To further investigate the random delays, the average
detection time, denoted by Td is analyzed. Td represents the expected value of the time
interval between the disturbance occurrence and the detection instant. The average detection
time is expressed in (3.33) [1]:
Td = τpmu +
1
2Ft
+ τe. (3.33)
In the Eq. (3.33), the first term is the data acquisition delay and the second term is the
expected value of waiting time for the transmission. The third term, τe, is the average value
of the detection delay. τe shows how fast the disturbances are detected after the instant of
data transmission. The value of τe depends on the likelihood of packet dropouts and degree
of communications delays. In our proposed structure, the following inequality holds [1]:
τe ≥ τpdc + 1
Ft
(3.34)
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and the lower bound for the average detection time is derived [1]
Td,LB = τpmu + τpdc +
3
2Ft
, (3.35)
where τpdc represents the PDC processing time as explained in [35].
In real-world scenarios, measurement noise and sudden load changes may result in false
detections (alarms) [84]. Under such circumstances, the probability of false detection should
be evaluated [1]:
pFD = Pr
{
ζ˜ = 1|ζ = 0
}
, (3.36)
where Pr{.|.} is the operator of the conditional probability. If PMUs encounter a large tim-
ing error during the phasor estimation process, then bad PMU data can be reported. Bad
PMU data should be detected and ignored before they are used by the detector otherwise,
they aggrandize the false detections [36, 44]. The proposed detection structure should be
augmented by a real-time identifier which prevents bad data from entering the detector. The
augmented structure counteracts delay, measurement noise, and bad PMU data and lowers
the probability of false detection.
The performance of the proposed structure can be assessed based on the values of the afore-
mentioned metrics. It should be underscored that, these statistical metrics do not impose
constraints on the method or complexity of the detector. In fact, they can be applied to
any monitoring/detection system which relies on synchrophasor networks. A smaller pFD
implies a more reliable disturbance detector. Moreover, a smaller Td indicates a faster data
acquisition system and higher robustness against loss of synchrophasor information. The
MGCC determines the control commands based on the type of disturbances, the microgrid
parameters, and the capacities of DG systems. Control links are used to transfer the control
signals from the MGCC to the local controllers belonging to the microgrid (refer to Fig. 3.1).
3.5 Numerical Results
3.5.1 Network Simulation Procedure
The test microgrid is a low-voltage residential network with circuit diagram illustrated in
Fig. 3.6. The proposed disturbance detection scheme is implemented in this microgrid that
incorporates DG systems and household loads. A PMU is deployed at each local PCC and
the two feeders have the same number of DG systems/loads, i.e., L is an even number. Sim-
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Figure 3.6 The single-line schematic of a microgrid with a radial structure and residential
loads [1]
ilar to most of PV-based networks [85], the DG systems employ three-phase voltage-sourced
converters (VSCs) and current controllers (at the primary level). The nominal values of
system frequency and voltage are 60 Hz and 380 V, respectively. In order to account for vari-
ations of energy consumption, the household consumers are modeled by random PQ loads.
Specifically, the real and reactive powers of loads are independent uniformly distributed over
[0, 10] kW and [0, 2] kVAR, respectively.
In the grid-connected mode, the DG systems can deliver a certain amount of real power
under unity power factor, i.e., Q∗ = 0 [75]. Therefore, the reactive power demanded by
the loads must be provided by the utility grid. At the secondary control level, the MGCC
matches the real power of DG systems to the average value of the consumed real power by
setting the setpoint of each DG system to P ∗ = 5 kW. In Fig. 3.6, Zl represents the model of
low-voltage line segments between adjacent local PCCs. The distance between neighboring
local PCCs is 40 m and the segment impedance is 0.64 Ω/Km. The DC voltage produced
by the energy sources that supply DG systems is fixed at VDC = 700 V. The inductance and
capacitance of the output LC filter are LF = 15 mH and CF = 10 µF, respectively. The
UTSP gains are as follows: µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = 67, µ4 = 20000, µ5 = 130, µ6 = 433, µ7 = 1333.
These values are chosen such that the response time of the PMU becomes less than one cycle.
42
The internal sampling rate of PMUs is Fs = 2000 samples/sec and the rectangular window
with size N = 120 is employed for windowing of estimated phasors. The extracted data are
transmitted at the rate of Ft = 20 fps, i.e., one frame every three cycles. The PMU and PDC
processing times are τp = 20 msec and τpdc = 0, respectively.
The disturbances are significant deviations of system frequency or voltage magnitude from
their nominal values that occur after islanding of the test microgrid at the time instant t = 1
sec. The nominal values of the frequency and magnitude are f0 = 60 Hz, and A0 = 1 pu.
Monte Carlo simulation method is adopted for statistical performance assessment of the pro-
posed disturbance detection structure. According to this simulation procedure, first random
loads are realized and the developed algorithms are sequentially executed. Afterward, the
results of the detector are captured and the values of the performance metrics are computed.
Whenever the value of the parameter ζ˜ changes from 0 to 1 before time t = 1 sec, then a false
detection is recorded. We suppose that only errors due to the measurement noise result in
a false detection. Moreover, all PMUs operate under the same input SNR, and the commu-
nications links have identical packet dropout rates. We also suppose that the MGCC does
not have a priori knowledge of the parameters σl,x and thus Eq. (3.30) is used for frequency
interpolations in case of data loss. The data communications delays are much smaller than
the reporting interval, i.e., τl,k  1/Ft . The simulation step time for the detection and
decision making at the secondary control level is set to 1 msec.
3.5.2 Discussion of the Numerical Results
Fig. 3.7 shows time-domain simulation results for two cases of fast and slow detections with
L = 4 PMUs. The input SNR of PMUs and the frequency disturbance threshold are 19 dB
and Γf = 0.1 Hz, respectively. Fig. 3.7 (a) reveals that, the loss of synchrophasor data in
case of severe packet dropouts is such that the data concentration algorithm cannot update
βf,k over a long period. As depicted in Fig. 3.7 (b), the detection time in the slow case is
slightly longer than 24 cycles. The slow detection of disturbances can significantly affect the
monitoring and centralized control applications. In the case of fast detection, however, the
detection time is equal to Td,LB. Note that in this network the detection time has a lower
bound equal to Td,LB = 125 msec.
Fig. 3.8 illustrates the reliability of the proposed structure in terms of probability of false
detection for different values of L. This simulation result shows that monitoring systems can
benefit from measurement diversity inherent in synchrophasor datasets. Moreover, in order
to maintain a constant pFD, the required input SNR of PMUs decreases by increasing the
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Figure 3.7 Cases of fast (solid curves) and slow (dashed curves) detection under packet
dropouts. (a): The normalized sum of deviations, (b): The detected state [1]
number of PMUs. By doubling L, the required SNR reduces 3 dB in the low-SNR region.
The simulation results shown in Fig. 3.9 demonstrate the performance of local detection
methods for the test microgrid. According to local detection methods, each DG system
constantly monitors the phasor information obtained at its local PCCs. The absolute value
of deviations in locally estimated frequency/amplitude data is compared with a threshold. If
the deviations exceed their thresholds, then the DG system sends a disturbance alarm to the
central control unit. In this figure, pFD shows the probability that at least one DG system
sends an alarm signal which happens if the absolute value of frequency deviation exceeds
0.1 Hz or magnitude deviation surpasses 0.1 pu. The concluding remark is that the local
detection methodologies have a high likelihood of false alarm in the low and moderate SNR
regions.
Comparisons of the simulation results presented in Figs. 3.8 and 3.9 demonstrate the advan-
tage of the proposed structure. The MGCC can reliably monitor voltage/frequency distur-
bances when σ2l ≤ −25 dB. In this SNR region the probability of false detection is smaller
than 10−6. In low to moderate SNR region, the centralized detector has a better performance
compared with local detection methods. This result substantiates the advantage of using the
44
SNR (dB)
10 13 16 19 22 25
p
F
D
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
   L = 2
   L = 4
   L = 6
   L = 8
Figure 3.8 Probability of false detection in the central detection [1]
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Figure 3.9 Probability of false detection in the local detection [1]
central detection structure for reliable monitoring and secondary control of DG systems.
The results of conventional and interpolative PDCs with L = 8 PMUs are given in Fig. 3.10.
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It can be seen that, the time required for detection of frequency disturbances increases by
increasing the dropout rate regardless of the data concentration method. By means of the
interpolative PDC, the disturbances are detected faster on average specially under severe
packet dropouts. For example, for a packet drop rate equal to 0.8, the interpolative PDC
results in 8 msec reduction of the detection time. However, the difference between detection
times is in excess of 39 msec for a dropout rate equal to 0.96.
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Figure 3.10 Performance comparison of interpolative and recursive PDC algorithms, Γf = 0.5
Hz, input SNR = 19 dB [1]
Fig. 3.11 demonstrates that a higher detection time results in a lower probability of false
detection and vice versa. In fact, a smaller pFD is achieved at the cost of a larger Td for a
fixed input SNR. It can be concluded that, for a given probability of false alarm, the detection
time can be decreased by increasing the number of PMUs in the microgrid. This simulation
result clearly shows the noise-delay tradeoff in synchrophasor-based monitoring applications.
Fig. 3.12 demonstrates the performance of the proposed structure in terms of the average
detection time. The synergy of the proposed disturbance detector with the interpolative
PDC increases robustness of monitoring applications against loss of synchrophasor data. For
the case of L = 8 PMUs, the average detection time is very close to its lower bound given
by Eq. (3.35). If the packet dropouts rate goes beyond 0.8, the detection time is expected
to rise gradually. The worst detection happens with L = 2 PMUs since in this case the data
concentration algorithm does not perform interpolation upon loss of synchrophasor data.
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Figure 3.12 The average detection time vs. packet dropout rate, Γf = 0.1 Hz, ΓA = 0.1 pu,
input SNR = 16 dB [1]
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter elaborates on a new structure for reliable and centralized detection of volt-
age/frequency disturbances in microgrids which utilize noisy and intermittent synchrophasor
data. It is verified that monitoring systems can use interpolative data concentration al-
gorithms in order to counteract severe noise and data losses in communications links. The
overall detection structure can even decrease the average detection time by using more PMUs.
It is also shown that the proposed detection structure is robust against the measurement noise
that enters PMUs. In the presence of noise, the reliability of the developed detection struc-
ture is assessed in terms of the probability of false detection. In particular, in the low and
mediate SNR regions, the performance of the proposed detection system is superior when
compared with that of local threshold-based detectors. It turned out that false detections
can be further suppressed at the expense of larger average detection time.
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CHAPTER 4 MONITORING OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
SYSTEMS
Hierarchical control/protection applications in smart grids require knowledge of the real-time
status of DG systems. Lack or failure of communications with the secondary control layer
significantly undermine the performance of such applications. Under such circumstances, the
control/protection applications cannot determine the operational energy sources. The high-
level control applications require a secondary monitoring method to track presence/absence
of DG systems in the network.
This chapter proposes a new monitoring approach that empowers the MGCC to estimate
the number of operational DG systems, determine the total generation capacity, and localize
the DG events. First, a parameter estimator is used to estimate an autoregressive model
for the synchrophasors of current symmetrical components (CSC) that flow into the main
PCC. Afterwards, an adaptive algorithm identifies sudden changes in DG status by inspect-
ing the norm of the forward prediction error. The received synchrophasor data from spatially
distributed nodes are used to construct local datasets. The local outlier probability (LOP)
method is applied on each local dataset in order to localize the DG events within the micro-
grid. The simulation results confirm that the secondary monitoring and localization methods
are robust against sudden load changes.
4.1 Introduction
Microgrids and ADNs are subject to diverse operating conditions due to prevalence of DG
systems as well as DS units [86]. In recent years, intelligent control architectures and data-
centric tools are under development [10, 87]. Smart microgrids and ADNs use intelligent
control methods to enhance the network performance in terms of reliability, efficiency, and
autonomous operation [13, 88, 89].
In general, different DG systems may exist in the network and their operating conditions
can change over the time. Power sharing and frequency/voltage restoration are possible if
DG systems are capable of communicating with the secondary controllers. DG systems that
rely on RESs usually employ a maximum power point tracking (MPPT) controller which
determines the reference for real power without any communications. Since DG systems
contribute to the flow of power, their presence or absence affects power transfer between the
network and the utility grid. The presence or absence of DG systems can also affect short
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circuit currents in case of line faults [90]. Hence, IEDs and other protection schemes should
be adapted to the new DG conditions [91], [92].
In conventional distribution grids, connection/disconnection of DG systems cannot be iden-
tified in real-time. Hence, inaccurate functionalities render the operation and protection of
entire network susceptible to disturbances and failures. To overcome these challenges, mi-
crogrids and ADNs need a secondary mechanism to follow the presence or absence of DG
systems based on the information extracted by PMUs. In light of monitoring mechanisms,
the high-level control applications improve the reliability and autonomous operation of the
network.
In smart microgrids, a secondary monitoring and localization system empowers the MGCC
to determine active DG systems. To accomplish DG monitoring, the following DG events
must be detected:
1. Disconnection event: a DG system is disconnected from the network, e.g., due to a
locally detected islanding, malfunction of the DG’s primary controller, or unwanted
opening of the inter-connection circuit breaker.
2. Connection event: an operational DG system connects with the network, e.g., after
closing the inter-connection circuit breaker.
We prove that the phasors of the CSC that are obtained at the main PCC can be modeled
as complex Gaussian random processes. Basically, the flow of power at the main PCC in-
cludes contributions of numerous loads and sources. A parameter estimator is used to obtain a
time-series model for the CSC based on the least-squares estimation method. The time-series
model is then used by a monitoring algorithm which distinguishes between changes in gen-
eration from load changes by inspecting the norm of the forward prediction error. Moreover,
the LOP method is applied to different local datasets of CSC in order to identify the location
of the DG events. The performance of the secondary monitoring algorithm is assessed by nu-
merical analysis of the probability of non-detection and also the probability of false detection.
4.1.1 Literature Review
Monitoring of DG systems is envisaged as a necessity for autonomous and reliable operation
of smart grids [93, 94]. The authors in [93] and [95] propose a new monitoring approach
that uses state estimation and geometric methods to detect the operational status of DG
systems. This methodology aims at identifying active DG systems under both balanced and
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unbalanced conditions, and requires two kinds of measurements: real-time information that
can be obtained from the SCADA system, and pseudo-measurements extracted from load
forecast systems. In [96], the authors discuss that online monitoring based on communica-
tions between controllers, smart switches and meters enhance the reliability and stability of
microgrids. In [94], the authors deal with an optimal sensor selection strategy which em-
ploys principal component analysis (PCA) method for monitoring of energy sources in wind
farms. Careful inspection of the previous works reveals that, the performance and efficiency
of DG monitoring where microgrids are subject to sudden load changes and renewable energy
variations are not fully addressed.
4.1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are mentioned as follows:
1. Use of fixed detection criteria (that are extracted based on oﬄine information) is not
an efficient methodology under random load/source variations. In this chapter, We
first obtain an online estimator that adaptively derives a time-series model for the
synchrophasors of CSC. In contrast with our approach, previous methods that deal
with filtering and state estimation only use the positive sequence component of voltage
signals at different buses [97, 98]. According to this approach, the transition matrix
of voltage states becomes a priori known, and the process noise is assumed to be
zero-mean. Our secondary DG monitoring method is basically a single-node but multi-
component analyzer. It is based on all sequence components (positive, negative, and
zero) of currents that flow into the main PCC of the microgrid.
2. Our secondary DG monitoring method depends on a PMU to obtain synchrophasors
of CSC and transmission of data to the MGCC. Hence, the complexity and data com-
munications overhead remain unchanged with changing the topology of the microgrid.
Furthermore, it depends only on online data to adaptively determine the criterion for
event detection and localization.
3. Unlike the existing methods [93, 94], we adopt a statistical metric to evaluate the per-
formance of the secondary DG monitoring under random fluctuations of RESs. The
numerical results indicate that, the secondary monitoring method has very good ro-
bustness against sudden load changes.
4.1.3 List of Symbols
Table 4.1 lists the symbols and their descriptions which are used throughout this chapter.
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Table 4.1 List of symbols in DG monitoring system
Symbol Description
t time
k Discrete time index
x Either of the symmetrical components p, n, z
p Vector of aggregated real power at the main PCC
q Vector of aggregated reactive power at the main PCC
x(k) Vector of the actual phasors of the x-sequences of currents
w(k) Process noise vector
e(k) Data noise vector
A Transition matrix
m Mean vector of process noise
Q Covariance matrix of process noise
R Covariance matrix of data noise
T Dataset update time
N Size of estimation dataset for the main PCC
D(k) Estimation dataset for the main PCC
`(k) Operational number of microgrid
NDG Number of DG systems in microgrid
Γ Deviation coefficient for event detection
NPMU Number of PMUs deployed within microgrid
NL Size of local datasets
D(k; bν) Local dataset of the node bν at time k
λ Significance level for event localization
m Nearest neighbor number
β(k; bν) LOP of the node bν at time k
4.2 Stochastic Analysis of the Phasors of CSC at the Main PCC
Suppose that the voltage and the current waveforms at the main PCC are expressed as [2]
vabc =

Va sin(ωt+ θa)
Vb sin(ωt+ θb)
Vc sin(ωt+ θc)
 (4.1)
iabc =

Aa sin(ωt+ δa)
Ab sin(ωt+ δb)
Ac sin(ωt+ δc)
 (4.2)
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Note that, the voltage in the above equation can generally show balanced and unbalanced
three-phase signals. The main PCC’s current signal is decomposed into the symmetrical
components as [99]:
Iabc = Ip + In + Iz (4.3)
with the subscripts p, n, and z representing the positive-, negative-, and zero-sequence com-
ponents, respectively. For the rest of our analysis, the variable x represents either of these
components:
x ∈ {p, n, z}
Besides, the time variable, t, is removed from the mathematical expressions. The phasors of
the x-sequences of the current at the main PCC are written as [2]
Ix = Ax exp(jδx) = Ix,r + jIx,i. (4.4)
Suppose that a large number of loads and energy sources are connected to each phase of
the microgrid. Under this supposition, the central limit theorem states that the algebraic
sum of the powers (flowing into the main PCC) follows a Gaussian distribution [82]. In fact,
many studies show that the Gaussian distribution can fairly describe the random behavior
of aggregated power in distribution grids [98, 100, 101, 102, 103].
Suppose that the aggregated real and reactive powers at the main PCC of the microgrid are
denoted by the vectors p, and q, respectively. We define these vectors as [2]
p , [Pa Pb Pc]T =

AaVa cos(θa − δa)
AbVb cos(θb − δb)
AcVc cos(θc − δc)
 (4.5)
q , [Qa Qb Qc]T =

AaVa sin(θa − δa)
AbVb sin(θb − δb)
AcVc sin(θc − δc)
 (4.6)
The aggregated real and reactive powers are statistically modeled by the mean vectors and
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the covariance matrices, i.e., p ∼ N (p¯,CP ), q ∼ N (q¯,CQ) where [2]
p¯ = E{p} = [µP,a µP,b µP,c]T (4.7)
q¯ = E{q} = [µQ,a µQ,b µQ,c]T (4.8)
CP = E{(p− p¯)(p− p¯)T} (4.9)
CQ = E{(q − q¯)(q − q¯)T} (4.10)
Microgrids may have three-phase loads, different types of transformer connections, and non-
transposed lines. Under these conditions, the real/reactive power that flows in one phase
becomes correlated with the real/reactive power in the other phases. Hence, the covariance
matrices CP and CQ are not necessarily diagonal. It is also known that, the real power of
loads can be interrelated with their reactive powers. Hence, the cross-covariance matrix is
also used for statistical characterization of the random aggregated power at the main PCC
[2]:
CPQ = E
{
(p− p¯)(q − q¯)T
}
(4.11)
Now, let Φ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) represent the set of arbitrary angles. The following trigonometric
vector functions are then constructed [2]:
cz(Φ) , [cosϕ1 cosϕ2 cosϕ3]T (4.12)
cp(Φ) , [cosϕ1 cos(ϕ2 + 2pi/3) cos(ϕ3 − 2pi/3)]T (4.13)
cn(Φ) , [cosϕ1 cos(ϕ2 − 2pi/3) cos(ϕ3 + 2pi/3)]T (4.14)
sz(Φ) , [sinϕ1 sinϕ2 sinϕ3]T (4.15)
sp(Φ) , [sinϕ1 sin(ϕ2 + 2pi/3) sin(ϕ3 − 2pi/3)]T (4.16)
sn(Φ) , [sinϕ1 sin(ϕ2 − 2pi/3) sin(ϕ3 + 2pi/3)]T (4.17)
In the phasor domain the x-sequences of the current signal are given by [2]
Ix,r =
1
3[Aa Ab Ac]cx(δa, δb, δc) (4.18)
Ix,i =
1
3[Aa Ab Ac]sx(δa, δb, δc) (4.19)
By using Eq. (4.5), and after some mathematical manipulations, it is concluded that [2]
cx(δa, δb, δc) = [
1
AaVa
1
AbVb
1
AcVc
]T 
(
p cx(θa, θb, θc) + q  sx(θa, θb, θc)
)
, (4.20)
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and
sx(δa, δb, δc) = [
1
AaVa
1
AbVb
1
AcVc
]T
(
p sx(θa, θb, θc)− q  cx(θa, θb, θc)
)
, (4.21)
In the above equations the operator  denotes the element-wise product. By putting Eq.
(4.20) into Eq. (4.18) and Eq. (4.21) into Eq. (4.19), the following relationships are derived
[2]
Ix,r = 1T3
(
ux,c  p+ ux,s  q
)
(4.22)
Ix,i = 1T3
(
ux,s  p− ux,c  q
)
(4.23)
where 13 is the vector with all elements equal to 1. Moreover, [2]
ux,c =
1
3[
1
Va
1
Vb
1
Vc
]T  cx(θa, θb, θc), (4.24)
ux,s =
1
3[
1
Va
1
Vb
1
Vc
]T  sx(θa, θb, θc). (4.25)
The previous expressions are then simplified as [2]:
Ix,r = uTx,cp+ uTx,sq (4.26)
Ix,i = uTx,sp− uTx,cq (4.27)
The above equations indicate that, the real and imaginary parts of the phasors Ix are linear
functions of the aggregated powers, given by (4.5). Note that the vectors p and q follow
a Gaussian distribution. Therefore, the phasors Ix are complex Gaussian random variables.
If we take the expectation of Eqs. (4.26) and (4.27), then the mean values of the real and
imaginary parts are derived as [2]
µx,r = uTx,cp¯+ uTx,sq¯ (4.28)
µx,i = uTx,sp¯− uTx,cq¯ (4.29)
Similarly, the variances of the real and imaginary parts are found as [2]
σ2x,r = E
{
(Ix,r − µx,r)(Ix,r − µx,r)T
}
(4.30)
σ2x,i = E
{
(Ix,i − µx,i)(Ix,i − µx,i)T
}
(4.31)
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Based on Eqs. (4.26) and (4.27), it is concluded that the variances are [2]:
σ2x,r = uTx,cCPux,c + uTx,sCQux,s + uTx,cCPQux,s + uTx,sCTPQux,c (4.32)
σ2x,i = uTx,sCPux,s + uTx,cCQux,c − uTx,sCPQux,c − uTx,cCTPQux,s (4.33)
As a result of interactions between random loads and DG systems, the real/reactive powers
vary over the time. Hence, it is plausible to assume that the phasors of CSC at the main
PCC can be modeled by time-series. The time-series of the phasors of CSC is composed of
Gaussian processes.
4.3 Secondary Monitoring of Distributed Generation
The main concept behind DG monitoring is that the time-series of the phasors of CSC is
pertinent to the temporal behavior of DG systems belonging to the microgrid. An illustration
of the proposed secondary monitoring mechanism is given in Fig. 4.1. The phasors of
CSC are acquired by a PMU at the main PCC, and then reported to the MGCC by data
communications links. At the secondary control level, first a parameter estimator deduces a
model for the time-series of the phasors of CSC using the received data. A decision making
algorithm employs the estimated model to identify disconnection or connection of DG systems
in real time. Once a change in DG is detected, a secondary control algorithm sends the new
commands to local controllers via control links.
4.3.1 Time-Series Modeling of The Phasors of CSC at the Main PCC
Based on the stochastic analysis presented in section 4.2, it can be concluded that the phasors
of CSC at the main PCC are correlated Gaussian random processes. The MGCC receives
real-time information from the main PCC and models the time-series of the phasors of the
currents as a vector autoregressive process [2]:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +w(k), k = 0, 1, 2, ... (4.34)
where
x(k) ,
[
Ip,r(k) Ip,i(k) In,r(k) In,i(k) Iz,r(k) Iz,i(k)
]T
(4.35)
denotes the vector of the actual phasors of the x-sequences of currents for the time k. The
matrix A ∈ R6×6 shows the transition matrix and the vector w(k) ∈ R6 shows the process
noise vector. Suppose that the vector e(k) ∈ R6 denotes the data noise vector. It is supposed
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Figure 4.1 The concept of secondary monitoring and control by the MGCC in the hierarchical
control structure [2]
that the data noise is independent of the process noise. The data vector is given by [2]
y(k) = x(k) + e(k). (4.36)
The process noise follows the Gaussian distribution with the following mean vector and
covariance matrix [2]:
m = E
{
w(k)
}
(4.37)
Q = E
{
(w(k)−m)(w(k)−m)T
}
(4.38)
The data noise (which is a zero-mean random process) has a Gaussian probability density
function (PDF) with the following covariance matrix [2]
R = E
{
e(k)e(k)T
}
. (4.39)
The vector e(k) is directly related to the performance of the PMU in terms of measuring
the synchrophasors. Hence, R is a priori known covariance matrix. The stochastic analysis
presented in section 4.2 reveals that:
• The mean of the process noise is not necessarily zero, i.e., m 6= 0.
• The elements of the vectors x(k) are not generally zero-mean random variables.
• The process noises for different CSC can be correlated to each other, i.e., the matrix
Q is not necessarily diagonal. The value of Q is a function of the covariance matrices
CP ,CQ, and CPQ.
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• If the microgrid remains stable over the time, then the mean vector and the covariance
matrix converge to fixed values. Moreover, the transition matrix for x(k) remains
stable, i.e., max
i
|λi| ≤ 1, λi ∈ SP(A).
4.3.2 Parameter Estimation
In order for the MGCC to have the model of the time-series of synchrophasors, the parameters
A, Q, and m must be estimated. The online parameter estimators are preferred (in contrast
with oﬄine estimators) since they are more flexible and can adaptively extract information
by processing the real-time data.
Definition 4.1: Dataset Update Time:
At the secondary control layer, the dataset update time denoted by Ts, is the time period
between two successive arrivals of data vectors. In general, the dataset update time is larger
than the reporting interval of the PMUs.
Algorithm 4.1 constructs the main PCC’s dataset which updates its elements in accordance
with Definition 4.1. The parameter N determines the size of the dataset.
Algorithm 4.1: Estimation Dataset for the Main PCC [2]
• Initialize: k = 0:
Begin with D(0) = {y0,y0, ...,y0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N elements
}, where y0 = [Aa cos(δa) Aa sin(δa) 0 0 0 0]T is the
initial data vector.
• Update: ∀k ≥ 1:
1. Obtain the data vector y(k) by reading the output of the data link at the time
instant t = kTs.
2. Construct a temporary dataset D˜ by removing the vector y(l|k−1) from D(k−1),
where y(l|k − 1) ∈ D(k − 1), 1 ≤ l ≤ N is the data vector whose measurement
time tag is the earliest.
3. Construct the complete dataset by appending y(k) to the temporary dataset:
D(k) ,
{
y1,y2, ...,yN
}
=
{
y(k), D˜
}
(4.40)
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After the estimation dataset for the main PCC is updated, the data vectors in D(k) are
centered as [2]
y′i = yi −
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi, yi ∈ D(k). (4.41)
Based on the centered data, the transition matrix is estimated such that the forward predic-
tion error is minimized for vector indices i = 2, ..., N . The following minimization problem
is obtained [2]:
Aˆ = arg min
Θ
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
‖ y′i −Θy′i−1 ‖2 (4.42)
If we solve the above minimization problem, then the least-squares estimate of the transition
matrix is given by [2]
Aˆ(k) =
N∑
i=2
y′iy′
T
i−1
N − 1
 N∑
i=2
y′i−1y′
T
i−1
N − 1
−1 (4.43)
Using (4.34), it is written [2]
x(i+ 1) = Aix(1) +
i−1∑
j=0
Ajw(i− j). (4.44)
It should be noted that e(k) ∼ N (0,R), hence, E{y(k)} = E{x(k)}. Assuming that the
matrix A is stable (the expected value of x(k) converges), the mean m is calculated by [2]
mˆ(k) =
 ∞∑
i=0
Aˆi(k)
−1 N∑
i=1
yi
N
. (4.45)
Using Eqs. (4.34) and (4.36), it can be readily shown that [2]:
y(i)−Ay(i− 1) = w(i− 1) + e(i)−Ae(i− 1). (4.46)
The random vectors w(i−1), e(i−1), and e(i) are independent, hence, the covariance matrix
is estimated based on the estimate of the transition matrix and the sample means as follows
59
[2]:
Qˆ(k) =−R − Aˆ(k)RAˆT (k) + 1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
(
yi − Aˆ(k)yi−1
)(
yi − Aˆ(k)yi−1
)T
− 1(N − 1)2
[
N∑
i=2
(
(yi − Aˆ(k)yi−1
)
×
N∑
i=2
(
(yi − Aˆ(k)yi−1
)T]
(4.47)
Although the size of the estimation dataset is fixed (equal to N), however, it is updated every
Ts seconds. Therefore, the proposed parameter estimator is adaptive and can effectively
model time-varying aggregated powers at the main PCC.
4.3.3 Secondary Monitoring Algorithm
The procedure of DG monitoring based on the proposed model identification is explained
in Algorithm 4.2. The output of this algorithm is the operational number of the microgrid
which is defined according to Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.2: Operational Number:
The operational number of the microgrid, denoted by variable `(k), is the estimated number
of DG systems that are operational (connected to the network).
The constantNDG denotes the number of DG systems that are deployed in the microgrid. The
operational number always maintains the inequality 0 ≤ `(k) ≤ NDG. It is worth mentioning
that, the MGCC triggers Algorithm 4.2 in a discrete-time manner, i.e., at the time instants
t = kTs,∀k > N . The constant Γ is the deviation coefficient for event detection. The
deviation coefficient and the size of the main PCC’s dataset are two important parameters
in the secondary DG monitoring. The optimal choice of theses parameters is explained in
the next subsection.
Algorithm 4.2: Secondary DG Monitoring [2]:
For a given Γ > 0, N > 0 and k > N :
1. Obtain D(k) according to Algorithm 4.1.
2. Extract the PCC’s parameters Aˆ(k) and mˆ(k), based on D(k).
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3. Calculate the forward prediction error as:
ε(k) = y(k)− Aˆ(k − 1)y(u|k − 1)− mˆ(k − 1), (4.48)
where y(u|k − 1) ∈ D(k − 1), 1 ≤ u ≤ N is the data vector whose measurement time
tag is the latest.
4. Calculate the backward mean and standard deviation of norms as:
µ(k) =
k−1∑
i=k−N
‖ε(i)‖
N
, (4.49)
ζ(k) =
√√√√ k−1∑
i=k−N
‖ε(i)‖2
N
− µ(k)2. (4.50)
5. Calculate the norm of the positive-sequence vector as:
η(k) = ‖y(k) [1 1 0 0 0 0]T‖ (4.51)
6. If |‖ε(k)‖ − µ(k)| > Γζ(k), then proceed to step 7, otherwise go to step 1 with time
index k + 1.
7. If η(k) > η(k − 1) & `(k − 1) ≥ 1, set `(k) = `(k − 1)− 1.
If η(k) < η(k − 1) & `(k − 1) < NDG, set `(k) = `(k − 1) + 1.
Otherwise, go to step 1 with time index k + 1.
In contrast with load variations, sudden changes in DG are not predictable, a phenomenon
that results in deviations from the one-step ahead predictions. Based on this premise, Al-
gorithm 4.2 attempts to identify connection/disconnection of DG systems by comparing the
norm of forward prediction error with its backward estimated mean values. It is assumed
that the DG systems based on RES inject balanced currents, hence, the connection events
are distinguishes from disconnection events by inspecting the norm of the positive-sequence
component.
4.3.4 Performance Assessment of the Secondary DG Monitoring
Algorithm 4.2 relies on real-time data to determine the criterion for detection and deci-
sion making. This substantially improves robustness of the monitoring algorithm against
variations of power consumption pattern. The accuracy of DG monitoring in terms of the
operational number is crucial for high-level control and protection applications. Harsh data
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noise degrades the model identification and thus lowers the reliability of DG monitoring.
Moreover, DG systems that use RESs may result in random power fluctuations. The power
fluctuations are detrimental to secondary DG monitoring in the sense that they decrease
detectability of DG events.
The adverse impact of the previous phenomena manifests itself in the probability of false
detection and probability of non-detection which are denoted by pfd and pnd, respectively.
pfd is the likelihood that a false disconnection/connection event is detected by the monitoring
algorithm. pnd shows the probability that a disconnection/connection event is not detected by
the monitoring algorithm. In general, the optimal performance of the monitoring algorithm
is achieved with the highest detection efficiency and reliability. Therefore, for a given size of
the estimation dataset, the optimal value of the deviation coefficient can be found from the
following equation [2]:
Γ∗ = arg max
Γ
(1− pfd)(1− pnd). (4.52)
It is worth mentioning that, (1− pfd)(1− pnd) in Eq. (4.52) is the product of reliability and
efficiency of detections, which can be translated to the accuracy of the estimated operational
number. If this quantity is equal to unity, then the MGCC is capable of tracking all connec-
tion and disconnection events without any false alarm.
Solving Eq. (4.52) to find the maximum performance depends on a partial knowledge of
power consumption by the microgrid loads. This knowledge can be obtained using either of
the following load characterization methods:
• Oﬄine knowledge: Oﬄine methods process the recorded power consumption data and
obtain empirical real/reactive power profiles for different buses. This knowledge is
obtained during the design and planning of monitoring system.
• Online knowledge: Online methods collect information from smart metering devices
and estimate the real/reactive power profiles [104]. This type of knowledge is almost
real-time.
Online load characterization methods can be augmented to the proposed control/monitoring
structure shown in Fig. 4.1. In this case, the MGCC is able to estimate the load variability
by archiving and analyzing the smart metering data in real-time. In particular, the MGCC
should extract the mean and variance of the real/reactive powers. Based on the derived
statistics and the capacities of DG systems, the solution for Eq. (4.52) is obtained by using a
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grid-search method. An advantage of using the online load characterization method is that,
periodic and adaptive estimation of the monitoring parameters (N and Γ) are achieved. This
improves the flexibility and efficiency of the DG monitoring system.
Synchrophasor data acquisition is subject to loss of clock reference or time synchronization,
which result in reporting bad PMU data. Aside from renewable energy fluctuations and
data impairments, bad synchrophasor data can deteriorate the performance of the secondary
DG monitoring algorithm. Since the secondary DG monitoring algorithm depends on data
extracted by a single PMU, it is crucial to filter out bad PMU data that may be reported
from the main PCC. A sophisticated data validation algorithm, e.g., see [36], is able to detect
bad data in real-time and replace them with the consistent data. It is also known that the
measurement diversity provided by several PMUs can improve the quality of data condition-
ing [105]. Hence, the MGCC can prevent bad synchrophasor data from affecting the DG
monitoring algorithm by employing diversity and validation methods in our proposed con-
trol/monitoring structure. The augmented structure reduces the probability of false detection
and thus improves the reliability of secondary DG monitoring.
4.4 Real-Time DG Event Localization
The localization of DG events provides valuable information for real-time monitoring and
reliable protection of microgrids. Generally, accurate localization of connection/disconnection
events requires measurement diversity which comes at the cost of installing more measurement
units in the network. By deploying PMUs at the power system nodes, the MGCC is able to
find the location of the DG system that has been connected/disconnected. This important
localization problem can be solved by using a local outlier detector which is explained in the
sequel.
4.4.1 Local Outliers in Synchrophasor Datasets
Once the operational number of the microgrid changes, the MGCC should make decision
about the location of the connected/disconnected DG system based on the received data
from the PMUs. It should be highlighted that, the presence/absence of a DG system at some
node affects the flow of power at the adjacent nodes. Therefore, one or more PMUs may
sense such events in terms of changes in nodal voltage/current patterns. The detectability of
changes in data patterns depends on the capacity and the location of the DG system with
respect to the monitoring PMUs. However, upon a DG event, the reported synchrophasor
data are likely to have outliers that can be detected. The following facts should be taken into
account in detection of data outliers upon occurrence of a connection/disconnection event:
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1. Synchrophasor datasets from different PMUs can simultaneously have outliers.
2. Renewable energy sources affect the features of synchrophasor datasets over the time.
It can be concluded that, the MGCC requires an adaptive identification algorithm to map
the synchrophasor pattern changes to data outliers. The bottom line of the identification
algorithm is that a degree of outlierness must be assigned to each detected outlier.
The local outlier factor (LOF) [106] and the local outlier probability (LOP) [107] are two
concepts that can quantify the outlierness of a data point with respect to its dataset. In
their seminal work, Breunig et al. developed a systematic approach for the LOF that assigns
an density-based score to each data point [106]. The LOF method is based on the notions
of k-distance (k is a positive integer) and reachability distance within neighborhoods of data
points. In the LOF method, the choice of k is critical for proper scoring in different datasets.
For example, a choice of k which is appropriate for a given synchrophasor dataset does not
necessarily yield an accurate outlier scoring for another dataset. Moreover, the LOF method
is basically designed for detection of outliers in clusters with uniform density. These draw-
backs of the LOF method can also worsen the effect of data noise and may lead to unreliable
detection results.
Kriegel et al. proposed the LOP concept which is a combination of density-based scoring with
probabilistic concepts [107]. The LOP method is based on the notion of probabilistic distance
of data points to their clusters. The main feature of the LOP method is that it includes a
normalization in the probabilistic scoring of outlierness. Hence, the outlier detection becomes
independent from the distribution of data. Moreover, the degree of outlierness is a number
within the range [0, 1] which can be interpreted as the likelihood of being an outlier. It turns
out that, unlike the LOF method, the LOP method is noise tolerant and can be applied to
different synchrophasor datasets. Motivated by this subtle point, we elaborate on the LOP
concept in order to obtain reliable detection results in synchrophasor datasets.
4.4.2 Localization Based on the Concept of Local Outlier Probability
Suppose that NPMU denotes the number of PMUs which are deployed within the microgrid
(excluding the main PCC). Each PMU reports the phasors of the x-sequences of currents that
flow into its associated power system bus. The observation nodes (or PMUs) are denoted by
bν where 1 ≤ ν ≤ NPMU . It should be underscored that, the PMUs may be deployed at buses
which are not necessarily the local PCC of a DG system. However, to remove ambiguity from
DG localization, the PMU placements should obey the condition 4.1.
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Condition 4.1: Unambiguous DG Localization:
Localization of the connection/disconnection events is unambiguous if the path that connects
the local PCC of a DG system to its nearest localizing PMU does not intersect with the sim-
ilar path for another DG system.
Utility grid
 !
"# 2
"# 1
"# 3
"# 4
PMU PMU PMU !  "
Figure 4.2 An illustration of ambiguity in localization for a radial microgrid with NPMU = 3
Figure 4.2 shows an example of ambiguity in monitoring and localization of DG systems.
This radial microgrid has four DG systems and three localizing PMUs. It is evident that,
PMU b1 is the nearest to DG 1, PMU b2 is the nearest to DG 2, and PMU b3 is the nearest
to DG 3 and DG 4. Considering the graph of this microgrid, the path that connects the local
PCC of DG 4 with PMU b3 intersects with that of DG 3. Hence, DG Localization based on
this PMU placement is not unambiguous.
Similar to (4.35), we represent data points in a six-dimensional Euclidean space
I(k; bν) ,
[
Ip,r(k; bν) Ip,i(k; bν) In,r(k; bν) In,i(k; bν) Iz,r(k; bν) Iz,i(k; bν)
]T
(4.53)
In (4.53), Ix,r(k; bν) and Ix,i(k; bν) are the real and imaginary parts of the phasors of the
x-sequences of currents that flow into node bν at time index k, respectively. The MGCC can
use a mechanism similar to Algorithm 4.1 in order to construct a local dataset for each node.
The local synchrophasor dataset for the node bν which is obtained at time index k is denoted
by D(k; bν) and is defined as in Definition 4.3.
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Definition 4.3: Local Synchrophasor Dataset:
At the time index k, the local dataset of size NL for the node bν is constructed as:
D(k; bν) ,
{
I(k −NL + 1; bν), I(k −NL + 2; bν), ..., I(k; bν)
}
(4.54)
It should be emphasized that, the update interval of the local dataset must equal the sample
time for the main PCC dataset, i.e., Ts seconds. Next, we have the definition of distance
between two data points that belong to the same local dataset:
Definition 4.4: Distance:
For a given node bν , the distance between two data points obtained at time indices k′ and
k′′ is defined as:
d(k′, k′′; bν) ,
√
[I(k′; bν)− I(k′′; bν)]T [I(k′; bν)− I(k′′; bν)] (4.55)
Based on the concept of local dataset and Definition 4.4 for distance, them-distance is defined
as follows:
Definition 4.5: m-distance:
For a given local dataset D(k; bν), the m-distance of the data point I(k′; bν) ∈ D(k; bν), de-
noted by dm(k′; bν), is defined as the distance between I(k′; bν) and its m-th nearest neighbor
in D(k; bν).
The above concepts allow us to define a context set for any data point, as explained in
Definition 4.6.
Definition 4.6: Context set:
For a given local dataset D(k; bν), the context set of the data point I(k′′; bν) ∈ D(k; bν),
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denoted by Sm(k′′; bν), is composed of data points that satisfy the following relationship:
Sm(k′′; bν) ,
{
I(k′; bν) | I(k′; bν) ∈ D(k; bν), d(k′, k′′; bν) ≤ dm(k′′; bν), k′ 6= k′′
}
(4.56)
Algorithm 4.3 explains the procedure of DG localization based on the concept of LOP. In
this algorithm, bνe represents the monitoring node which is associated with the connec-
tion/disconnection event in the probabilistic sense. The constant λ and the operator erf(.)
denote the significance level and the error function, respectively. The error function is nu-
merically evaluated based on the following expression:
erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
exp(−y2)dy (4.57)
It is worth mentioning that the value of the significance level does not affect ranking of outliers
in the local synchrophasor datasets. However, it does affect the likelihood that sudden load
changes appear as outliers.
Algorithm 4.3: DG Localization Algorithm:
For a given m > 0, λ > 0, 1 ≤ ν ≤ NPMU , and k > NL:
1. Obtain the local dataset D(k; bν)
2. Extract all context sets Sm(k′′; bν) based on Eq. (4.56) and using the neighbor search
method around every data point I(k′′; bν) ∈ D(k; bν)
3. Calculate the standard distance for every data point I(k′′; bν) ∈ D(k; bν) as
σm(k′′; bν) =
√√√√ 1
‖Sm(k′′; bν)‖
∑
k′
(
d2(k′, k′′; bν) | I(k′; bν) ∈ Sm(k′′; bν)
)
(4.58)
4. Calculate the probabilistic local outlier factor (PLOF) as
γ(k′′; bν) =
σm(k′′; bν)
1
‖Sm(k′′;bν)‖
∑
k′
(
σm(k′; bν) | I(k′; bν) ∈ Sm(k′′; bν)
) − 1 (4.59)
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5. Calculate the standard PLOF as
α(k; bν) =
√√√√ 1
‖D(k; bν)‖
∑
k′
(
γ2(k′; bν) | I(k′; bν) ∈ D(k; bν)
)
(4.60)
6. Calculate the LOP
β(k′′; bν) = max
{
0, erf
( γ(k′′; bν)
λ
√
2α(k; bν)
)}
(4.61)
7. Localize the connection/disconnection event: Find the node index that shows the max-
imum LOP at the time index k:
νe = arg max
ν
β(k; bν) (4.62)
In step 1 of Algorithm 4.3, the MGCC obtains NPMU local datasets at the time instant
t = kTs. Assume that D(k; bν) is the local dataset in which existence of an outlier is investi-
gated. In step 2, a neighbor search method is used to extract NL context sets for this dataset.
In step 3, the standard distance of data points is calculated by finding the square root of the
mean squared distance. In fact, σm(k′′; bν) is the density around data point I(k′′; bν) based
on its context set. The PLOF for data points is calculated in step 4. In (4.59), the estimated
density σm(k′′; bν) is centered and normalized by the average of the densities around all data
points that belong to the context set Sm(k′′; bν).
Step 5 of Algorithm 4.3 calculates the standard PLOF based on the values of the normalized
PLOFs for all data points in the dataset. Eq. (4.61) in step 6 maps the estimated PLOF into
a number that lies in the interval [0, 1] and is interpreted as the LOP. If the value of β(k′′; bν)
is close to 0, then the data point I(k′′; bν) is located within a dense cluster and thus is not
likely to be an outlier. The basic premise in Eq. (4.61) is that sufficiently large number of
independent components are involved in the distances and thus the random PLOFs follow
a Gaussian distribution. γ(k′′; bν) ≤ 0 implies that data point I(k′′; bν) is not an outlier,
and the max{., .} operator is used to map such a PLOF to zero LOP. For γ(k′′; bν) > 0,
however, the error function in Eq. (4.61) shows the probability that the PLOF falls in the
range [−γ(k′′; bν), γ(k′′; bν)] with a significance λ.
The last step in Algorithm 4.3 identifies the location of the DG event. The localization is
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based on the hypothesis that, if a connection/disconnection event is sensed by some moni-
toring PMUs at time index k, then the data points I(k; bν) are outliers with respect to their
associated dataset but with different scores. Therefore, in a probabilistic sense, the monitor-
ing PMU which shows the largest LOP has the highest chance of being associated with the
DG event.
4.5 Simulation Results
4.5.1 Network Simulation
The proposed DG monitoring algorithms are implemented in the IEEE 13-Bus network [108].
The single-line diagram of this distribution microgrid is illustrated in Fig. 4.3. The power cir-
cuit, monitoring PMUs, and the monitoring algorithms are simulated by MATLAB/Simulink.
The short circuit power of the utility grid is 300 MVA and its short circuit ratio is equal to
SCR = 7. The nominal voltage and the frequency of the microgrid are 15 kV and 60 Hz,
respectively. Four DG systems driven by PV energy sources are deployed in the microgrid,
i.e., NDG = 4. The rated powers of DG systems are identical, and they are locally controlled
with unity power factor by MPPT controllers. The monitoring PMU is deployed at bus 1
which is the main PCC of the microgrid. Four localizing PMUs (NPMU = 4) are deployed at
the following buses:
• Node b1: PMU at bus 7
• Node b2: PMU at bus 6
• Node b3: PMU at bus 11
• Node b4: PMU at bus 10
It can be concluded that the DG localization in this network is unambiguous.
The real/reactive powers of the loads are independent identically distributed. Table 4.2 shows
the distribution of real and reactive powers of loads, where U [α, β] denotes the uniform PDF
over the interval [α, β]. Table 4.2 gives the PDFs of powers for one statistically balanced
scenario and two unbalanced scenarios with high/low degree of variability. The mean of real
powers is 60 kW in both low and high variability profiles. However, the standard deviations of
the real powers are 3.46 kW and 14.43 kW in the low and high variability profiles, respectively.
The high variability profile in the unbalanced scenario is deliberately adopted to verify the
performance of the DG monitoring approach under sudden load changes.
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Figure 4.3 The single-line diagram of the test microgrid and the locations of DG systems and
monitoring PMUs [2]
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Figure 4.4 The simulated (dashed curves) and theoretical (solid curves) CDFs of In,r(k) at
the main PCC [2]
4.5.2 Monte Carlo Load Flow Simulations
The objective of Monte Carlo simulations is to numerically validate the stochastic analysis
of the phasors of the CSC (presented in section 4.2) for the main PCC. To extract the actual
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distributions of the phasors of the CSC, extensive load flow simulations are carried out with
DG systems disconnected from the microgrid and negligible measurement noise. In each
load flow simulation, the phasors of currents flowing into the main PCC are evaluated and
stored for statistical analysis. Fig. 4.4 shows the CDFs of the real part of the phasor of
the negative-sequence component. The solid and dashed curves indicate the actual CDF
and the theoretical CDF of a Gaussian process, respectively. For the balanced scenario, the
theoretical CDF is plotted with the mean µn,r = 0, and standard deviation σn,r = 2.37.
For the unbalanced scenario, the theoretical CDF has a mean µn,r = 8.9 and a standard
deviation σn,r = 1.9. It can be seen that the simulated CDFs match the theoretical CDFs in
both scenarios. This observation corroborates the hypothesis that the synchrophasors of the
CSC at the main PCC can be modeled as Gaussian processes.
4.5.3 Time-Domain Simulations
In the time-domain simulations, real/reactive power fluctuations due to operation of the DG
systems are taken into account. PV variability is simulated by feeding realistic solar power
data into the network. The solar power data are provided by NREL (integration studies
dataset in the state of Georgia) [109]. Every 1 sec, a load is randomly selected and its
real/reactive powers change in accordance with the unbalanced scenarios given in Table 4.2.
Hence, the dataset update time at the secondary control layer is set as Ts = 1 sec. We adopt
two daily scenarios with different spatio-temporal features of solar energy:
• Sunny day: clear sky condition with high degree of correlation between the powers of
DG systems.
• Cloudy day: scattered clouds in the sky with low degree of correlation between the
powers of DG systems
Figs. 4.5 (a) and (b) show the real powers generated by the DG systems in the aforementioned
PV scenarios. It can be seen that, the highest degree of power variability occurs in the cloudy
day. With respect to the secondary DG monitoring, the cloudy day represents a worst-case
Table 4.2 The distributions of the per-phase real/reactive powers of loads in different scenarios
Statistically Balanced Statistically Unbalanced(High Variability Profile)
Statistically Unbalanced
(Low Variability Profile)
Active power
(kW)
Reactive power
(kVAr)
Active power
(kW)
Reactive power
(kVAr)
Active power
(kW)
Reactive power
(kVAr)
Phase A U [0, 20] U [0, 5] U [20, 40] U [0, 20] U [28, 32] U [8, 12]
Phase B U [0, 20] U [0, 5] U [10, 30] U [0, 10] U [18, 22] U [3, 7]
Phase C U [0, 20] U [0, 5] U [5, 15] U [0, 5] U [8, 12] U [1, 5]
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Figure 4.5 The per-phase real powers generated by DG systems in the period of one day: (a)
Sunny day (b) Cloudy day [2]
scenario. It is worth mentioning that, the identical PV modules are departed enough so that
they show different output patterns during cloudy day.
To assess tracking of DG events over the time, different connection and disconnection events
occur according to the following sequence:
• t = 150 min: DG system 3 is disconnected form the microgrid.
• t = 250 min: DG system 4 is disconnected from the network.
• t = 300 min: DG system 3 reconnects with the microgrid.
• t = 350 min: DG system 4 reconnects with the network.
The time-domain simulation results for the sunny day are presented in Figs. 4.6-4.8. As
shown in Fig. 4.6 (a), under the low variability profile, abrupt changes in the status of DG
systems result in distinguishing peaks in the norm of forward prediction error. Note that
under the low variability profile in the unbalanced scenario, the standard deviation of the real
power of the loads is 3.46 kW. Therefore, the dispersion of the power absorbed by the loads is
substantially less than the actual power of DG systems in the sunny day. As demonstrated in
Fig. 4.6 (b), the DG monitoring algorithm updates the operational number of the microgrid
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Figure 4.6 DG monitoring over the time in the unbalanced scenario with the low variability
profile: R = 10−2I, N = 120, Γ = 4 [2]
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Figure 4.7 DG monitoring over the time in the unbalanced scenario with the high variability
profile: R = 10−4I, N = 120, Γ = 4 [2]
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over the time.
The simulation results for the high variability load profile in the sunny day are presented in
Figs. 4.7 and 4.8. By careful inspection of Fig. 4.7 (a) it can be concluded that significant
load changes may lead to major deviations in the norm of forward prediction error. This
observation is justified by the fact that, with the high variability profile, the standard devia-
tion of the real power of the loads is 14.43 kW. Therefore, the dispersion of the real powers
absorbed by the loads is comparable to the actual power of DG systems. Despite the abrupt
changes in power consumption, the monitoring algorithm can prevent spurious events as can
be seen in Fig. 4.7 (b). To elucidate the time-domain results, connection and disconnection
events are detectable at the secondary control layers if the dispersion of the power consumed
by local loads does not dominate over actual power of DG systems.
Fig. 4.8 demonstrates the negative impact of data noise under the high load variability profile.
It can be seen that data noise along with a sudden load change at the time t = 190 min
result in a false detection. Nevertheless, the two disconnection events at the times t = 150
min and t = 250 min and the connection event at t = 300 min are properly detected by the
secondary monitoring algorithm. It is worth noting that, the connection of DG system 4 at
the time t = 350 min is detectable, however, it is disregarded by the MGCC. This is due to
the constraint that the operational number cannot surpass the total number of DG systems.
By comparing the results shown in Figs. 4.8 and 4.6, it is concluded that the deleterious
effect of noise in synchrophasor data is intensified by the high variability of loads. From
the vantage point of the secondary DG monitoring, the worst case is related to the high
dispersion of the load’s powers and non-trivial data noise.
4.5.4 Performance Evaluation of Secondary DG Monitoring
Next, the performance the proposed secondary monitoring algorithm is assessed by extract-
ing false alarms and non-detections in the test network. In order to numerically evaluate
the statistical performance metrics, a large number of simulations are carried out. In each
simulation, a DG system is randomly selected and then at a random time, belonging to the
interval [100, 500] min, it is disconnected from the microgrid. Fig. 4.9 depicts the probabil-
ity that the secondary monitoring algorithm declares more than a false alarm in the daily
scenarios. It can be seen that, it is important to properly set the size of the estimation
dataset, N , in order to ensure a reliable DG monitoring. Furthermore, the DG monitoring
algorithm gains higher robustness against synchrophasor noise by raising the value of the
deviation coefficient, Γ. It is also worth noting that, the likelihood of a false alarm in the
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Figure 4.8 DG monitoring over the time in the unbalanced scenario with the high variability
profile: R = 10−2I, N = 120, Γ = 4 [2]
cloudy day is slightly greater in comparison with the sunny day. This observation implies
that the operational number is prone to more errors under RES variability and non-trivial
data noise.
The probability of non-detection versus different sizes of the estimation dataset is depicted in
Fig. 4.10. It can be seen that, a proper size of the estimation dataset improves the accuracy
of the parameter estimator and decreases the probability of non-detection. The monitoring
algorithm is able to detect most of the disconnection/connection events in the sunny day.
However, substantial renewable energy fluctuations in the cloudy can obscure DG disconnec-
tion/connection events and increase the probability of non-detection.
Figs. 4.11 and 4.12 show the efficiency of the monitoring algorithm for different values of the
deviation coefficient. The simulation results given in Fig. 4.11 demonstrate the impact of
load variability on DG monitoring. If the standard deviation of the real power of the loads
is small enough, then the optimal value of the deviation coefficient results in the highest effi-
ciency. Note that an efficiency equal to 100% means that the MGCC is capable of detecting
all connection/disconnection events without false alarms. If the standard deviation of the real
power of the loads increases, then the maximum efficiency which can be achieved is 93.4%.
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Figure 4.9 The probability of false detection vs. the size of estimation dataset: Unbalanced
scenario with the high variability profile, R = 10−2I [2]
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Figure 4.10 The probability of non-detection vs. the size of estimation dataset: Unbalanced
scenario with the high variability profile, R = 10−3I [2]
This result reveals the extent in which the huge load changes can reduce the detectability of
DG connection/disconnection events.
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Figure 4.11 The efficiency of the monitoring algorithm as a function of the deviation coeffi-
cient: Sunny day, R = 10−2I, N = 180 [2]
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Figure 4.12 The efficiency of the monitoring algorithm as a function of the deviation coeffi-
cient: Unbalanced scenario with the high variability profile, R = 10−3I, N = 180 [2]
Fig. 4.12 indicates how the solar energy fluctuations affect the efficiency of the monitoring
algorithm. Note that the variance of the noise is decreased by 10 dB and the maximum
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efficiency with the high load variability in the sunny day goes up to 97%. The result validates
good robustness and high reliability of the monitoring algorithm in the presence of huge
load changes and small-scale solar energy variations. The result shows that, the maximum
efficiency which is achievable in the cloudy day with high load variability is 29% less than
efficiency in the sunny day. In order to alleviate this problem, DS units can cooperate with
DG systems to moderate solar energy fluctuations and recover the efficiency of DG monitoring
in cloudy days [110].
4.5.5 DG Localization
The performance of the localization method (Algorithm 4.3) is investigated for the sunny
day with the high variability profile in the unbalanced scenario. Unless otherwise stated, the
localization algorithm employs the following parameters: m = 20, λ = 6, and NL = 120.
Fig. 4.13 shows the values of LOP for the observation nodes when DG system 1 is discon-
nected at time 250 min. The LOP values are calculated at the detection time, i.e., when the
secondary DG monitoring (Algorithm 4.2) changes the operational number of the microgrid.
It can be seen that, the highest LOP is associated with the node b1. This indicates that the
disconnection of DG system 1 results in a distinguishing outlier in the local dataset of the
node b1. At this detection time, the LOPs for the observation nodes b2− b4 are less than 0.2.
Therefore, Algorithm 4.3 can localize the DG event by finding the maximum LOP among
different observation nodes.
Fig. 4.14 demonstrates how the LOP for the observation node b3 varies over the time. In this
simulation, DG system 3 is disconnected at the time 150 min and then reconnects at the time
300 min. It can be seen that, the LOP is 0.9 and 0.99 at the time indices of disconnection
and connection, respectively. Therefore, the disconnection and connection of DG system 3
are easily detectable. In addition to these time indices, there are three time indices that the
LOP exceeds 0.6. These large LOP values are related to significant load changes at the buses
11 and 12 according to the high variability profile. The majority of LOP values in the time
interval [100, 350] min are less than 0.4.
Figs. 4.15 (a)-(d) compare the values of LOP for the observation nodes b1-b4, respectively.
DG system 3 is disconnected at the time 150 min and then reconnects at the time 300 min and
the significance level for outlier detection is decreased to λ = 3. Note that the LOP values for
the observation node b3 are 0.99 and 1 at the time indices of disconnection and connection,
respectively. By comparing Fig. 4.15 (c) with Fig. 4.14 it turns out that the LOP of events
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Figure 4.14 The values of LOP vs. time for the observation node b3
are larger with smaller λ. In contrast with LOP values depicted in Fig. 4.14, the majority
of LOP values are larger than 0.4. The results shown in Figs. 4.15 (a)-(d) reveal that, the
disconnection/connection events are completely detectable by Algorithm 4.3. In fact, the
LOP values for the node b3 are remarkably larger than the LOP for the other observation
nodes at the detection time indices. These simulation results substantiate the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithm in terms of identifying DG events within the microgrid.
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Figure 4.15 The comparison between the LOPs of different observation nodes: λ = 3
4.6 Conclusion
Adaptive model-based, and probabilistic methods for secondary monitoring of DG events
are developed. By adopting our proposed algorithms, the MGCC can reliably estimate the
number of operational DG systems and find the location of the systems that have changed
their status. It was shown that the phasors of the CSC at the main PCC can be modeled as
complex Gaussian random variables. Afterward, a least-square parameter estimator extracts
the model of the phasors of the CSC. The monitoring algorithm employs the extracted
model to evaluate the forward prediction errors and detect disconnection/connection events.
Simulation results revealed that the proposed monitoring algorithm can properly update the
detection threshold based on the previously received data. In light of this flexibility, it can
reliably track the operational number of the microgrid over the time. It was shown that, the
LOP method can be applied on local synchrophasor datasets in order to detect the outliers
that stem from DG connection/disconnection events. When the operational number of the
microgrid changes, the location of the DG events is identified by finding the maximum LOP
among different observation nodes.
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CHAPTER 5 COORDINATED PROTECTION AND SECONDARY
CONTROL
Unlike conventional energy networks, smart grids include different technologies and integrated
systems that necessitate coordination. In particular, secondary control systems should co-
operate with protection systems in order to improve power quality while protecting power
system components. The cooperation between protection and control systems is vital for
reliable operation of distribution networks. This chapter elaborates on a new approach for
backup protection and secondary control of DG systems in ADNs. The backup protection
is accomplished by a centralized fault detection method which processes synchronized data
in real-time. In the presence of DG systems, faults must be detected within a critical time,
otherwise the post-fault stability of network is jeopardized. The primary objective of the
fault detector is to identify faults which are not detected by local relays within a tolerance
time. The fault detection triggers a secondary control algorithm that makes decision about
the optimal setpoints of DG systems. The secondary controller (SC), which has access to
archived synchrophasor datasets, calculates the real/reactive power disturbances after the
fault. The proposed approach is called coordinated protection and secondary control which
leverages restoration of voltage and frequency in the islanded part of the network. The
coordination between protection and control functionalities is achievable by accounting tor
the response time of the protective devices and the communications delays. The proposed
mechanism is a promising method for reliable and adaptive protection that ultimately leads
to improved situational awareness in ADNs.
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, ADNs will employ a large number of DG systems, renewable
sources, and metering/electronic devices. The power exchange in such networks is bidirec-
tional which implies that the power can be delivered to consumers even when the network
operates in the islanded mode (disconnected from the utility grid). However, the high pene-
tration of DG systems results in new challenges in terms of hierarchical control and protection
against faults [111, 112, 113].
From the network control vantage point, DG systems are classified as slave and master
systems [114]. The master DG systems stabilize the voltage/frequency and are controlled as
voltage source in the islanded operation mode [114, 115]. The slave DG systems are typically
controlled as current source and generate real/reactive power based on the setpoints according
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to a centralized/distributed control strategy. The presence of different types of DG systems in
the network may result in protection issues. Short-circuit current variability, relay failure in
fault clearance, and subsequent stability concerns are among the major issues that may take
place in ADNs [90, 116]. The isolation of a faulty line leads to transition of a portion of the
network into the islanded operation mode. The islanded subnetwork employs master/slave
strategy or a droop control strategy to stabilize voltage/frequency and maintain the power
quality in the acceptable range [117, 118].
5.1.1 Literature Review
Communication systems can be effectively used by hierarchical control and protection ap-
plications [119]. By virtue of communications, digital relays and IEDs are able to send and
receive information and change their protection settings according to the conditions of the
network [120, 121]. A communication-based relaying strategy for fast fault isolation is intro-
duced in [122]. Based on this protection method, the network is divided into different sections
for rapid restoration of power and minimal service outage. In [123], a communication-based
over-current relaying method is proposed for radial distribution networks. This protection
scheme requires installation of directional over-current relays at the two ends of the line. The
communications systems transfer inter-tripping and blocking signals in order to isolate faults
that lie in the primary protection zones of relays [123].
Protection and control schemes that account for the impact of DG systems in microgrids are
discussed in [124] and [125]. The paper written by Ustun et al. [124] deals with a central
protection method based on the IEC 61850 standard. Their proposed method facilitates de-
tection of the fault current direction by updating the protection settings of the relays. In this
method, the central unit should monitor the microgrid’s operation mode, the status of DG
systems, and the nominal current values [124]. It is known that synchronous machine-based
and inverter-based DG systems can remarkably affect the microgrid stability in the fault-
triggered islanded mode [125]. The authors in [125] point out that, the fault isolation time
must be less than a critical value to ensure post-fault stability. Specifically, the critical isola-
tion time depends on three factors: the loads, the control mode of DG systems (real/reactive
power or voltage/frequency control), and the network control scheme (master/slave or droop-
based).
Recently, synchrophasor data analysis is used for detection of faults in transmission lines
[126, 61]. Identification of the faulty branch and estimation of the fault location is discussed
in [126]. The fault location is estimated through the fast Fourier transform (FFT) of equiva-
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lent voltage phase angles at different nodes. The authors in [61] develop a wide-area backup
protection method for transmission lines. The line faults are detected based on the processing
of the zero- and positive-sequence components of currents that flow into the faulty zone. The
authors also propose an optimization model in order to determine the minimum number of
PMUs required for their backup protection system [61].
A remarkable setback in the previously mentioned methods is that the time requirements of
post-fault stability are not taken into account in the detection process. Specifically, if the
network configuration undergoes some changes, e.g., by sudden connection/disconnection of
DG systems, then the conventional protection methods may clear the faulty line after the
critical isolation time. The late isolation of fault can jeopardize the post-fault stability of
voltage/frequency in the islanded subnetwork. Another shortcoming of the existing methods
is that the impacts of fault detection time and communication delays are not fully analyzed.
It should be stresses that, these delays may lead to loss of coordination between protection
and fault-triggered control of DG systems.
5.1.2 Contributions
In this chapter, a versatile approach is proposed which improves adaptive backup protection
and centralized control systems. At the secondary control layer, a central unit receives syn-
chrophasor data from different PMUs and identifies faults in accordance with the post-fault
stability requirements. The protection and control functionalities are performed based on the
processing of synchrophasor datasets and exchange of protective/control signals. A decision
making algorithm finds the post-fault setpoints of real/reactive powers of DG systems that
belong to the islanded subnetwork. The setpoints of DG systems are calculated by consider-
ing communication delays between the local controllers and the SC.
This chapter has two main contributions which are summarized as follows:
1. Adaptive backup protection: The proposed approach isolates line faults in a critical
clearance time. This way the detector ensures the post-fault stability and improves
smooth transition into the islanded operation mode. Moreover, a request-reply mech-
anism is devised to localize faulty segment in real-time. Spatio-temporal analysis of
voltage magnitude and frequency data empowers the central detector to distinguish
faults from grid disconnection events.
2. Enhanced fault-triggered control: A decision making algorithm solves a quadratic mini-
mization problem in order to determine the post-fault reference powers of DG systems.
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The decision making algorithm minimizes the total control effort and mitigates the
adverse effect of communication delays. An exponential cost factor is assigned to a DG
system which has a communication delay greater than the protection response time.
The control mechanism is coordinated with the protective actions by transmitting con-
trol commands at the proper times.
The simulation results confirm that the proposed approach improves reliability of protection
and also facilitates post-fault voltage/frequency recovery in ADNs.
5.1.3 List of Symbols
Table 5.1 lists the symbols and their descriptions which are used throughout this chapter.
5.2 Line Protection
As described in Section 2.3 PMUs, PDCs, and data communication links are the main com-
ponents of synchrophasor networks. Assume that a local synchrophasor network is employed
by a distribution network. The PMUs are sources of information that are connected to the
local PDC via data communication links. The local PDC provides synchrophasor datasets
for the secondary/central control unit of the distribution network.
The procedure of coordinated backup protection and secondary control is depicted in Fig.
5.1. As illustrated in this figure, the SC communicates with the local PDC, the digital relays,
and the local controllers of DG systems. In this approach, the SC is responsible for timely
detection of potential faults and management of DG systems. Moreover, the SC should co-
ordinate control of DG systems with the critical protective actions.
‘
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Figure 5.1 The concept of coordinated protection and control based on synchrophasor data
processing in distribution grids [3]
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Table 5.1 List of symbols in coordinated protection and control system
Symbol Description
t Time
k Discrete time index
x Either of the phases A,B,C
∆Vx(k) Mean magnitude deviation for phase x
∆f(k) Mean frequency deviation
fn Nominal frequency
Vx,n(bi) Nominal voltage magnitude of phase x of observation node bi
δf (k) Range of frequency data
τpmu PMU processing time
τpdc PDC processing time
τdat Time delay in the communications of synchrophasor data
Fr Reporting rate of PMUs
τldd Largest data delay
Nf (k) Frequency disturbance counter
N+V,x(k) Over-voltage disturbance counter in phase x
N−V,x(k) Under-voltage disturbance counter in phase x
δil Islanding band
I¯x(k; bi, bj) Normalized magnitude of the current of phase xin the edge (bi, bj)
efl Faulty edge
Tfl Fault tolerance time
Til Islanding tolerance time
Γf Threshold of frequency disturbance
Γ+V,x Threshold of over-voltage disturbance
Γ−V,x Threshold of under-voltage disturbance
∆Px Perturbation in real power
∆Qx Perturbation in reactive power
kfl Fault detection index
(P ?x,i, Q?x,i) Setpoint of real/reactive powers of phase x before the fault
(P ??x,i, Q??x,i) Setpoint of real/reactive powers of phase x after the fault
Tcb Operation time of circuit breakers
τrel Communication delay in relay links
η Increment constant
Th,i Hold times
τctl,i Communication delay in control links
Assume that L PMUs are deployed at the distribution network and the synchrophasor data
are reported at a rate of Fr fps. Under the normal (grid-connected) operation mode, the
set of PMUs are represented by an undirected graph as M = (B, E). The set of vertices
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is denoted by B = {b0, b1, ..., bL−1}, and the set of edges is represented by E . Each PMU
is associated with a unique observation node (vertex) of the graph, bi ∈ B, and each edge
ei ∈ E represents a pair of adjacent observation nodes. The following conventions are used
throughout this chapter:
• The vertex with the lowest index, b0, represents the main PCC of the network
• Each edge is associated with two contiguous buses of the network
After isolation of the faulty line, the portion of the network which operates in the normal
(grid-connected) mode is associated with a subgraphMgm = (Bgm, Egm). The islanded por-
tion of the network can potentially operate under the islanded mode and is associated with
a subgraphMim = (Bim, Eim). Suppose that efl ∈ E is the faulty edge, i.e., the line segment
incurring the fault. The subgraphs Mgm and Mim are determined by removing the edge
efl from the network graph. Accordingly, the end vertices of the faulty edge will belong to
the sets Bgm and Bim. Similarly, the DG systems within the network can be divided into
two groups. Gim and Ggm indicate the sets of DG systems that belong to the islanded and
grid-connected subnetworks, respectively.
The SC has the knowledge of the type, location, and the rated power of the DG systems.
Hence, it needs to find the faulty edge in order to infer the subgraphsMgm andMim, and the
DG sets Ggm and Gim. An example of subgraphs of a radial ADN is shown in Fig. 5.2. In this
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Figure 5.2 An example of formation of subnetworks due to a fault between buses b0 and b2
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network, the edge (b0, b2) incurs a line fault and thus the DG sets are Ggm = {g2, g3, g5, g8}
and Gim = {g1, g4, g6, g7}.
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Figure 5.3 The flowchart of centralized fault identification [3]
Fig. 5.3 shows the functional flowchart of the proposed detection approach in smart distri-
bution networks. In this chapter, the variable x represents either of the phases A,B,C:
x ∈ {A,B,C}
Suppose that f(k; bi), Vx(k; bi) and θx(k; bi) denote the frequency, voltage magnitude and
phase angle reported from the phase x of the node bi at the time index k, respectively. Based
on the synchrophasor dataset for the time index k, the SC calculates the mean magnitude
and frequency deviations as [3]:
∆Vx(k) =
1
L
L−1∑
i=0
(
Vx(k; bi)− Vx,n(bi)
)
, (5.1)
∆f(k) = 1
L
L−1∑
i=0
(
f(k; bi)− fn
)
, (5.2)
In the above equations, fn denotes the nominal frequency, and Vx,n(bi) shows the nominal
voltage magnitude of the phase x of the observation node bi. If the distribution network
operates in off-nominal conditions then the mean magnitude/frequency deviation given by
Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2) will change which can undermine the performance of the fault detector
and the SC. To solve this problem the disturbance detector system is necessary. The distur-
bance detection system in Chapter 3 is designed to detect off-nominal conditions as fast and
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reliable as possible.
As discussed in Subsection 2.3.1, the data conveyed by the synchrophasor dataset have iden-
tical measurement time. This allows the SC to measure the range of frequency data at the
time index k [3]
δf (k) , max
i
{
f(k; bi)
}
−min
i
{
f(k; bi)
}
, bi ∈ B (5.3)
A reliable fault detector should be able to differentiate faults from grid disconnection events.
To this aim, it is necessary to analyze the temporal correlations in synchrophasor datasets.
It should be noted that, PMUs employ parameter estimators as described in Section 3.2.
This implies that when the network undergoes a transition, coupling between the estimated
phasors and the frequency data is likely. Therefore, a line fault that inherently affects the
phasor data can also have impacts on the frequency data. In this case, the frequency data
may exhibit deviations from normal values. Basically, the system frequency is a network-
wide parameter [127]. However, under the impact of faults, the frequency data reported
from different observation nodes may not be consistent (assuming noiseless measurements).
Therefore, the SC may observe disturbances in the reported magnitude data as well as in-
congruous disturbances in the reported frequency data. It is thus crucial to cope with false
islanding alarms, and ensure reliability of fault detection over the entire network.
Now let tfl denote the time instant that a line fault occurs in the work. Moreover, suppose
that the data links in the local synchrophasor network are lossless, i.e., there is no packet
dropout. As a consequence of the fault, the SC receives a series of magnitude disturbance
data with a time latency. In this setting, the first synchrophasor dataset that conveys mag-
nitude/frequency disturbance is received with a delay upper bounded by [3]:
τldd =
1
Fr
+ τpmu + τdat + τpdc, (5.4)
In Eq. 5.4, τpmu and τpdc are the PMU and the PDC processing times, respectively. The
parameter τdat represents the time delay in the communications of synchrophasor data. The
value of τdat depends on the data communication links. The SC can take advantage of the
time tags embedded in synchrophasor data packets and estimate the value of τdat. It is there-
fore cogent to suppose that the value of the data communication delay is constant during the
detection interval, and is a priori known by the SC. In general, faults can occurs randomly
at any time between two consecutive data reporting instants. Based on this fact, 1/Fr in Eq.
5.4 indicates the largest delay in the reporting of disturbance data. From the vantage point
of centralized protection, Eq. (5.4) gives the worst case of delay in fault detection.
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It is known that, the conventional protection systems may not isolate faults in a timely
manner. This issue is likely to arise when high-capacity DG systems affect short-circuit cur-
rents [90], [116]. In this case, a backup protection scheme should detect faults within the
proper time. Algorithm 5.1 explains the steps involved in the centralized detection of faults
based on synchrophasor data processing. Basically, this algorithm employs three disturbance
counters, namely, N−V,x(k), N+V,x(k), and Nf (k). These counters are updated upon arrival of
synchrophasor datasets and are used to identify persistent voltage/frequency disturbances.
In Algorithm 5.1, the parameter δil denotes the islanding band. The islanding band is a
detection parameter that defines an upper limit for the range of frequency data expressed
in Eq. 5.3. The values of δf (k) are compared with the islanding band to verify congruous
disturbances in the reported frequency data. If the instantaneous range of frequency data re-
mains below this band, then an islanding event can be potentially the source of the observed
disturbances.
The variable I¯x(k; bi, bj) in Algorithm 5.1 denotes the normalized magnitude of the current
of phase x that flows into the edge (bi, bj) at time k. This parameter is calculated as [3]:
I¯x(k; bi, bj) =
Ix(k; bi, bj)
Ix,n(k; bi, bj)
, (bi, bj) ∈ E (5.5)
In the above equation, Ix(k; bi, bj) and Ix,n(k; bi, bj) denote the reported and the nominal
current magnitudes of the edge (bi, bj), respectively. The SC obtains the value of Ix(k; bi, bj)
by means of a request-and-reply mechanism. The SC first sends a request message to the
local relays associated with the edge (bi, bj). Upon reception of the request message, the
relays reply their instantaneously measured current. It is worth noting that, the SC has a
priori knowledge of the nominal current magnitudes for each edge.
Algorithm 5.1: Centralized Fault Detection [3]
For k = 0:
Initialize N−V,x(0) = N+V,x(0) = Nf (0) = 0.
For k > 0:
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1) Calculate ∆Vx(k), and ∆f(k) based on (5.1) and (5.2), and update disturbance counters:
N−V,x(k) = max
(
N−V,x(k − 1) + sgn
(
Γ−V,x −∆Vx(k)
)
, 0
)
(5.6)
N+V,x(k) = max
(
N+V,x(k − 1) + sgn
(
∆Vx(k)− Γ+V,x
)
, 0
)
(5.7)
Nf (k) = max
(
Nf (k − 1) + sgn
(
|∆f(k)| − Γf
)
, 0
)
(5.8)
2) Differentiate islanding events from faults:
Proceed to islanding alarm if either of the conditions (C-I) and (C-II) is met, otherwise go
to step 3.
• Condition (C-I): Persistent over-voltage disturbance:

N+V,x(k)/Fr + τldd ≥ Til for at least one value of x
N−V,x(k)/Fr + τldd < Tfl for the rest of values of x
• Condition (C-II): Persistent frequency disturbance:
 Nf (k)/Fr + τldd ≥ Tilδf (k) ≤ δil
3) Detect fault:
If one of the conditions (C-III), (C-IV), (C-V) is satisfied, then set the detection index as
kfl = k and proceed to step 4. Otherwise, go to step 1 with time index k + 1.
• Condition (C-III): Single-phase fault:

N−V,x(k)/Fr + τldd ≥ Tfl, for exactly one value of x
∆Vx(k) > 0, for the other two values of x
• Condition (C-IV): Two-phase fault:

N−V,x(k)/Fr + τldd ≥ Tfl, for two values of x
∆Vx(k) > 0, for the other value of x
90
• Condition (C-V): Three-phase fault:
N−V,x(k)/Fr + τldd ≥ Tfl, for all values of x
4) Identify faulty edge:
Identify the edge incurring the fault based on the values of the normalized fault currents:
efl = arg max
(bi,bj)∈E
∑
x|∆Vx(kfl)<0
I¯x(kfl; bi, bj) (5.9)
5) Trigger secondary protection & control:
Send trip command to the relays protecting the edge efl.
∗ sgn(.) is the sign function.
The constants Tfl and Til in Algorithm 5.1 represent the fault and the possible islanding
tolerance times, respectively. The constant Γ−V,x < 0 is the threshold of under-voltage distur-
bance. The constants Γ+V,x > 0 and Γf > 0 are the thresholds of over-voltage and frequency
disturbance for verification of islanding events, respectively. As discussed in Chapter 4, the
SC can employ elaborate data processing methods to track the presence/absence of DG sys-
tems over the time. Based on the knowledge of the operational DG systems and types of
loads, the SC decides about the proper value of the fault tolerance. In this approach, the
backup protection scheme satisfies the requirements of voltage/frequency stability after the
fault clearance.
The frequency/voltage disturbance thresholds for fault detection are determined during the
network design stage. Once the locations and the rated capacities of DG systems are known,
islanding simulations are carried out to determine the islanding band δil and thresholds Γf ,
and Γ+V,x. It should be highlighted that, some transients due to switching, lightning, etc.
can entail observable disturbances in the frequency data reported from some nodes. In this
regard, Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2) attenuate the impact of such transient disturbances by averaging
the deviations over all observation nodes. Hence, islanding events are verified only if such
transients last longer than the islanding tolerance time. It is worth mentioning that, line
faults which have very low impedance result in significant under-voltages that are observable
at most of the nodes. The extent of the voltage drop varies among different observation nodes,
however, the under-voltage remarkably affects the mean magnitude deviation expressed in
Eq. 5.2. Fault studies/simulations are useful for finding the proper value of Γ−V,x provided
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that the DG systems operate at their maximum power.
Step 2 of Algorithm 5.1 verifies possible islanding events by monitoring persistent over-
voltages or frequency excursions. Particularly, Condition (C-I) investigates disturbance in
the form of over-voltage in at least one phase with the other phases showing normal condi-
tions. Condition (C-II) analyzes the features of frequency data across the entire network.
Upon disconnection of the network from the utility grid, the frequency data reported from
observation nodes differ from the nominal frequency. The occurrence of islanding translates
into congruous and persistent deviation of frequency data. This means that δf (k) remains in
the islanding band, and the mean frequency deviation oversteps the threshold Γf . It should
be noted that, the data extraction by PMUs is generally sensitive to the amplitude of the
input voltage signals. Line faults significantly affect the voltage amplitude which in turn may
result in incongruous frequency deviations. In this case, step 3 of Algorithm 5.1 proceeds to
the fault verification if δf (k) goes beyond the islanding band. The SC detects a line fault if
at least one phase shows persistent under-voltage, and the other (healthy) phases show in-
creased voltage magnitude. In step 4 of Algorithm 5.1, the SC first acquires the magnitudes
of fault currents by sending request messages to the relays via relay links. Afterward, the
faulty segment is detected by searching for the edge which has the largest total normalized
current. In step 5, trip commands are sent to the relays associated with the edge efl and the
secondary control for Gim is triggered. This procedure is similar to direct transfer trip (DTT)
scheme in which remote circuit breakers are tripped upon reception of the trip command [116]
It is worth mentioning that, the SC receives a generic object oriented substation event
(GOOSE) message from the local protection system if the relays detect the fault before
the tolerance time is elapsed [128], [129]. This allows the SC to determine the DG systems
that belong to the islanded subnetwork and perform the DG management properly. Different
steps in Algorithm 5.1 are devised such that the fault detector can differentiate faults from
other events in a timely manner. In what follows, the response of the SC to a fault and the
DG management procedure are discussed.
5.3 Secondary Control of Islanded Subnetwork
Assume that the SC identifies a fault on the edge efl = (bl, bm) (through a GOOSE mes-
sage or Algorithm 5.1). Fig. 5.4 shows the single-line model of the faulty segment which
is connected to a load with impedance Zx,l,m. The line impedances, that are denoted by
Zl and Zm, are assumed to be fixed and known by the SC, and the shunt admittance is
ignored. Moreover, suppose that the observation node bl is closer to the b0 (the main PCC)
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Figure 5.4 Single-phase model of the edge (bl, bm): Zl and Zm are the line impedances, Zx,l,m
denotes the load impedance [3]
than the observation node bm. Upon fault detection, the associated circuit breakers CBl,
CBm operate and thus the grid-connected and islanded subnetworks are created. After this
protective action is performed, the observation nodes bl and bm belong to the sets Bgm and
Bim, respectively.
One of the main functionalities of the SC is to maintain reliable operation of the network and
ensure economic power exchange with the utility grid. Hence, the SC should mitigate the
impact of faults on the power quality and minimize the power outage. To this aim, a control
mechanism is triggered by the SC that ensure power delivery for the islanded subnetwork.
The primary objective of the fault-triggered control scheme is to manage the DG systems
that belong to Gim by updating their setpoints. In this method, the hierarchical droop-based
control of the islanded subnetwork starts with minimal power mismatch between sources
and consumers. In the islanded subnetwork, load sharing and voltage/frequency stability
are achieved by a hierarchical droop control method [127], [118]. This secondary control ap-
proach results diminishes post-fault transients and improves restoration of voltage/frequency
for the islanded subnetwork.
The isolation of the faulty edge efl results in changes in the real/reactive power exchanged
at the node bm. These power changes are calculated as [3]:
∆Px = <e
{−Z∗x,l,mVmV ∗l + (Z∗l + Z∗x,l,m)|Vm|2
Z∗l Z∗m + (Z∗l + Z∗m)Z∗x,l,m
}
(5.10)
∆Qx = =m
{−Z∗x,l,mVmV ∗l + (Z∗l + Z∗x,l,m)|Vm|2
Z∗l Z∗m + (Z∗l + Z∗m)Z∗x,l,m
}
(5.11)
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where,
Vl = Vx(ν; bl) exp
(
jθx(ν; bl)
)
, (5.12)
Vm = Vx(ν; bm) exp
(
jθx(ν; bm)
)
, (5.13)
ν = kfl − dTflFre (5.14)
The operator dye shows the nearest integer number that is larger than or equal to y. Accord-
ing to the above formulations, ∆Px < 0 (∆Qx < 0) implies that the real (reactive) power
flows from the grid-connected portion into the prospective islanded portion of the network.
Once the faulty edge is detected, the SC can easily evaluate these important parameters by
requesting access to the previously archived datasets in the local PDC .
Suppose that gim,i ∈ Gim represents the ith DG system that belongs to the islanded subnet-
work, 1 ≤ i ≤‖ Gim ‖, and ‖ Gim ‖≥ 1. Let (P ?x,i, Q?x,i) denote the setpoint of real/reactive
powers of phase x of gim,i immediately before the fault instant, i.e., when the network oper-
ates normally. Furthermore, suppose that Smax,i (VA) shows the maximum per-phase power
of the DG system gim,i. After detection of a faulty edge, the SC decides about the new
setpoints for the DG set Gim. The decision making process minimizes the total control effort
and compensates for lack/excess of real/reactive powers in the islanded subnetwork. This
decision making process is expressed as the minimization problem P with non-linear con-
straints for each phase, Eqs. (5.15)-(5.19) [3]. In the control problem P , the positive number
ζi > 0 indicates the cost factor for the secondary control of the DG system gim,i. The solution
of the decision making problem P are found by means of an iterative trust-region method
[130].
P : Minimize
{(Px,i,Qx,i)}
‖Gim‖∑
i=1
ζi
(
(Px,i − P ?x,i)2 + (Qx,i −Q?x,i)2
)
(5.15)
subject to:
∆Px +
‖Gim‖∑
i=1
Px,i − P ?x,i = 0, (5.16)
∆Qx +
‖Gim‖∑
i=1
Qx,i −Q?x,i = 0, (5.17)
P 2x,i +Q2x,i ≤ S2max,i, i = 1, 2, ..., ‖ Gim ‖ (5.18)
Px,i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ..., ‖ Gim ‖ (5.19)
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Communication links are employed to transfer control commands between the SC and the
local controllers of DG systems. The TCP is deemed to be a reliable data communications
protocol for these control links [124]. As discussed in Section 3.3, the TCP-based control links
can impose communication delays. The communication delay is a probabilistic parameter
of the networked control systems which varies in a known range [131]. Moreover, different
control links may lead to different delays in the arrival of control signals at DG systems. It
is concluded that the efficacy of the DG management mechanism depends on the commu-
nication delays. The SC is able to assess the expected value of communication delays by
inspecting the acknowledgment signals in the control links. The variations of delays can be
compensated by adapting the cost factors before solving the problem P as explained in the
sequel.
Suppose that τctl,i indicate the average communication delay in the control link between the
SC and the local controller of the DG system gim,i. From a networked control perspective,
local controllers that are expected to receive commands with larger delays have higher con-
trol costs. Moreover, the SC should estimate the total time needed for the fault clearance
to properly coordinate between the protection and the control of DG systems in Gim. The
mechanism of secondary control for the islanded subnetwork is explained in Algorithm 5.2. In
this algorithm, (P ??x,i, Q??x,i) are the solutions of the control problem P which show the optimal
post-fault setpoints.
In step 3 of Algorithm 5.2, first the feasibility of droop-based islanded control for the DG
set Gim is verified. If the total power demanded by loads is higher than the total capacity
of DG systems in the islanded subnetwork, then a load shedding mechanism is invoked [?
132]. The SC triggers the load shedding in order to decrease the power consumption in the
islanded subnetwork. The cost factors for secondary control of Gim are determined in step 4
of Algorithm 5.2. Equations (5.21) and (5.22) are exponential models that adjust the cost
factors based on the average communication delays in control links, and the increment con-
stant η. According to this model, the cost factors exponentially rise if control commands are
likely to be applied later than the fault clearance instant.
In the proposed approach, the fault clearance time depends on two important parameters that
are related to time, namely Tcb and τrel. Tcb represents the required time for the operation of
the circuit breakers. τrel is the total communication delay in two-way signal communications
between the relays and the SC. It should be noted that, the operation time of the circuit
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breakers is a fixed parameter of the protection system, and is thus is assumed to be known by
the SC. Here, a basic assumption is that the operation time of the circuit breakers is larger
than the delay in relay links, i.e., τrel ≤ Tcb.
Algorithm 5.2: Secondary Control of Gim [3]
1. Calculate ∆Px and ∆Qx for all values of x ∈ {A,B,C}.
2. Calculate the total pre-fault powers for Gim:
P ?x =
‖Gim‖∑
i=1
P ?x,i, Q
?
x =
‖Gim‖∑
i=1
Q?x,i (5.20)
3. If condition (C-VI) is satisfied, then proceed to the load shedding mechanism for the
islanded subnetwork. Otherwise, go to step 4.
(C-VI) :
√
(P ?x −∆Px)2 + (Q?x −∆Qx)2 >
‖Gim‖∑
i=1
Smax,i
4. If the fault is detected by the central detector, then set the cost factors as
ζi =

1 τctl,i ≤ τrel + Tcb
e
η
(
τctl,i−τrel−Tcb
)
o.w.
(5.21)
If the fault is detected by local relays, then use
ζi =

1 τctl,i ≤ Tcb − τrel
e
η
(
τctl,i+τrel−Tcb
)
o.w.
(5.22)
5. Based on the calculated cost factors in step 4, solve the problem P for each phase and
obtain (P ??x,i, Q??x,i).
6. If the fault is detected by the central detector, then calculate the hold times by:
Th,i = max
(
τrel + Tcb − τctl,i, 0
)
(5.23)
If the fault is detected by local relays, then use:
Th,i = max
(
Tcb − τrel − τctl,i, 0
)
(5.24)
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After the hold time Th,i is elapsed, send (P ??x,i, Q??x,i) to the system gim,i.
The SC should make decision about the time instant that the post-fault setpoints of real/reactive
powers should be transfered to the local controllers. This time coordination is translated into
transmission of some control commands with some delay. In other words, the signal commu-
nications start after a known hold time, denoted by Th,i, is elapsed. The time coordination
between protective actions and the management of DG systems in Gim is accomplished in
step 6 of Algorithm 5.2. The hold times for coordination can be estimated based on the mean
communication delay in the control links and the fault detection case (local or centralized).
In this step, Eqs. (5.23) and (5.24) attempt to apply the new setpoints of DG systems after
the fault clearance. According to this timing method, the DG set Gim is not likely to inject
further power in the presence of the fault.
A basic assumption in Eqs. (5.21) and (5.22) is that the DG systems in the islanded subnet-
work have equal response times. However, depending on their types and the technology, DG
systems may have different response times upon arrival of control commands. DG systems
which have larger response time require more time to change their output powers. In this
case, an effective method is to associate higher cost factors to the DG systems with slower
response. Therefore, the cost factors should be determined according to the total control
delay. The total control delay is the sum of the control link delay and the relative response
delay of the DG systems.
It should be highlighted that, the focus of this chapter is on fault-triggered management of
DG systems in ADNs. In the context of hierarchical control, it is plausible to assume that the
operating DG systems can receive setpoint commands from the SC. However, the proposed
approach can be easily generalized to networks with both controllable and uncontrollable DG
systems. To this aim, the decision making problem P is solved only for those DG systems
which are able to receive commands from the SC. Since the real/reactive power disturbances
(∆Px,∆Qx) are found through real-time synchrophasor data, the structure of Algorithm 5.2
is not affected by the presence of uncontrollable DG systems in the network.
5.4 Simulation Results
5.4.1 Network Simulation
The proposed approach for coordinated backup protection and control of DG systems is im-
plemented for the IEEE 34-bus distribution network with the circuit diagram shown in Fig.
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Figure 5.5 The IEEE 34-bus distribution network with DG systems, circuit breakers, and
distributed PMUs [3]
5.5. The nominal system frequency is fn = 60 Hz, and the nominal voltage is 24.9 kV. As
shown in this figure, 17 PMUs are deployed across the main feeder and the edges belong to
the set E = {(bi, bi+1), i = 0, 1, ..., 15}. The parameter estimator employed by the PMUs is
the UTSP (as detailed in chapter 3). A local PDC collects the synchrophasor data from the
PMUs and feeds the datasets to the SC. The communications delays in the synchrophasor
network are identical, and unless otherwise stated, the fault detector and the SC parameters
are given in Table 5.2. As illustrated in Fig. 5.5, five inverter-based DG systems, namely
g1 − g5, are connected to the observation nodes b12 − b16, respectively. The inverter-based
DG systems operate under balanced condition, in the current control mode, and with unity
power factor. Table 5.3 gives the real powers (before the fault instant) and the per-phase
capacities of DG systems.
Over-current relays are deployed in each segments of the main feeder to protect the network
against line faults. The protection settings of the over-current relays are in accordance with
the extremely inverse trip characteristics [133]. The circuit breakers operate after 3 cycles
from arrival of the trip command. The Electromagnetic Transients Program EMTP-RV
simulates the electrical part of the network and the data acquisition by PMUs. A MATLAB
module is employed for solving the decision making problem P and management of DG
systems. Different time-domain and statistical simulations are carried out for performance
evaluation of the coordinated protection and control scheme.
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Table 5.2 The values of parameters for centralized fault detection simulations
Parameter Description Value
tf Fault instant 1 sec
Fr Reporting rate of PMUs 120 fps
τpmu PMU processing time 15 msec
τpdc PDC processing time 2 msec
τdat Delay in synchrophasor data communications 5 msec
Tcb The operation time of circuit breakers 50 msec
τrel Delay in transfer of trip & GOOSE messages 5 msec
Tfl The fault tolerance time 200 msec
Γf The threshold of frequency disturbance 0.1 Hz
Γ+V,x The threshold of over-voltage disturbance 0.1 p.u
Γ−V,x The threshold of under-voltage disturbance −0.2 p.u
η The increment constant in exponential model 0.1 msec−1
δil The islanding band 1 Hz
Table 5.3 The real/reactive powers of inverter-based DG systems under the normal condition
DG system: gi Smax,i (kVA) P ?x,i (kW) Q?x,i (kVAr)
g1 150 10 0
g2 120 10 0
g3 100 10 0
g4 90 10 0
g5 70 10 0
5.4.2 Differentiating Faults From Islanding Events
Figs. 5.6 (a)-(c) show the simulation results when the entire network becomes isolated from
the utility grid at time t = 1 sec. After the islanding moment, the mean frequency deviation
exceeds the disturbance threshold Γf and thus the frequency disturbance counter increases
with the arrival of data at the SC. The instantaneous range of frequency data versus the
time is demonstrated in Fig. 5.6 (c). It is evident that δf (k) shows small-scale frequency
perturbations that tend to settle around zero. It is seen that, the instantaneous range of
frequency data falls below the islanding band δil. It can be concluded that the frequency
disturbances are both persistent and congruous. These results satisfy the condition (C-II) in
Algorithm 5.1 which is related to an islanding event.
Figs. 5.7 (a)-(c) demonstrate the simulation results in the case of a three-phase fault close
to the main PCC. As can be seen in this figure, this particular fault entails incongruous
deviations in the frequency data, and the frequency disturbance counter rises. However,
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Figure 5.6 Persistent disturbance in the frequency data when the entire network becomes
isolated from the utility grid at time t = 1 sec. (a): The mean frequency deviation, (b): The
frequency disturbance counter, (c): The instantaneous range of frequency data [3]
unlike the islanding case, the instantaneous range of frequency data oversteps the islanding
band. Hence, the frequency disturbances are not persistent and congruous in the case of
this fault. Therefore, step 3 of Algorithm 5.1 investigates the occurrence of a fault within
the network. The presented simulation results validate the effectiveness of the developed
backup protection scheme. By comparing Figs. 5.6 and 5.7 in turns out that the faults
can be distinguished from the islanding events by inspecting spatio-temporal features of
synchrophasor data.
5.4.3 Statistical Analysis of Fault Data
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the statistics of voltage magnitude and frequency data when ran-
dom faults occur across the main feeder. The obtained statistics give insight into the variation
patterns of the reported synchrophasor data with respect to minimum, maximum and mean
values. A large number of simulations have been run to extract the statistics of reported
data in the presence of different types of faults. In each run, first an edge is randomly chosen
and then a specified fault occurs on that edge at the fault time tfl. Afterward, the frequency
and voltage magnitude data which are archived by the local PDC are processed. A time
window (which begins at the fault instant) with the length of 200 msec is used for statistical
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analysis. For a given fault type, the mean values of reported data are calculated by averaging
the archived data over all observation nodes.
The statistics shown in Table 5.4 indicate that nearly all observation nodes report sensible
voltage drops in the faulty phases. The voltage magnitude data associated with the healthy
phases show some temporary perturbations, but the mean values are higher than the nominal
values. The results summarized in Table 5.5 demonstrate the important features of frequency
data reported after the faults occur. For single-phase faults, the reported frequency data tend
to incur temporary (trivial) disturbances and as it was expected, the mean value is approx-
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Figure 5.7 Incongruous disturbances in the frequency data when a three-phase fault occurs
between nodes b2 and b3 at time t = 1 sec. (a): The mean frequency deviation, (b): The
frequency disturbance counter, (c): The instantaneous range of frequency data [3]
Table 5.4 The statistics of reported voltage magnitude data for different types of faults
Fault Type
Voltage Magnitude (p.u.)
Phase A Phase B Phase C
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
Single-phase Fault
(Phase A-Ground) 0.0002 1.0079 0.3618 0.9177 1.1819 1.0732 0.9133 1.1160 1.0347
Two-phase Fault
(Phases A-B-Ground) 0.0002 1.0080 0.3726 0.0013 1.0100 0.3716 0.3111 2.1971 1.0759
Three-phase Fault
(Phases A-B-C-Ground) 0.0000 1.0080 0.3540 0.0000 1.0100 0.3632 0.0000 1.0056 0.3523
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imately equal to fn. In the case of two- and three-phase faults, however, the disturbances
carried by the frequency data can be significant. It is evident that the minimum and max-
imum values of reported frequency data are likely to deviate from the nominal value. It is
worth mentioning that, the negligible amplitude of voltage signals that are measured at some
nodes may influence the estimation of instantaneous frequency. Three-phase faults are severe
contingencies that result in incongruous disturbances in reported frequency data, e.g., the
mean of frequency data is 2.345 Hz less than the nominal value. The results for three-phase
faults clarify the incongruous frequency disturbances by comparing the maximum value of
the frequency data with their minimum value. These incongruous frequency disturbances
are discernible when the range of frequency data does not remain within the islanding band.
Algorithm 5.1 uses this detection strategy to differentiate legitimate faults from islanding
events.
Table 5.5 The statistics of reported frequency data for different types of faults
Fault Type Frequency (Hz)Min Max Mean
Single-phase Fault
(Phase A-Ground) 59.2301 62.4417 60.0246
Two-phase Fault
(Phases A-B-Ground) 34.1950 86.4769 60.0323
Three-phase Fault
Phases A-B-C-Ground) 52.9431 60.9863 57.6550
5.4.4 Time-Domain Scenario I: Fault Detection by Local Relays
In the first time-domain scenario, a single-phase fault occurs in the phase A of the edge
(b13, b14). In this test, the local over-current relays identify the fault at t = 1.173 sec, and the
detection time is less than the fault tolerance time. Therefore, the fault is locally detected
by over-current relays and a GOOSE message is received by the SC at t = 1.178 sec. The
detection index for this case is thus equal to kfl = 140.
Fig. 5.8 shows the frequency data reported from three nodes in the network. This illustrative
result reveals that the frequency data reported from different observation nodes are not
necessarily identical in the presence of the fault. This figure also shows that the first dataset
that conveys disturbances is received by the SC at the time t = 1.025 sec. This means that
if the fault occurs at tfl = 1 sec, then the data communication delay is 25 msec. It should
be underscored that, the largest data delay in this synchrophasor network is τldd = 30.3
msec (calculated based on Eq. (5.4)). The mean frequency deviation and the frequency
disturbance counter versus the time are plotted in Fig. 5.9. It can be seen that, Nf begins
102
counting at the time t = 1.025 sec, however, it decreases to zero after an interval of 6/Fr.
The return of this counter to zero indicates that the frequency disturbances are not persistent
in the presence of this single-phase fault.
After the GOOSE message is received by the SC, the faulty edge is identified as efl = (b13, b14).
In this scenario, the islanded subnetwork is associated with the DG set Gim = {gim,1 =
g3, gim,2 = g4, gim,3 = g5}. Since the fault is detected by the local relays in a timely manner,
the response time of the protection system is equal to 45 msec. The SC uses Eq. (5.22) to
calculate the exponential cost factors for decision making. The performance of the SC in
terms of post-fault voltage recovery in scenario I is demonstrated in Fig. 5.10. Fig. 5.10 (a)
shows the voltage signal provided that the communication delays in control links are all equal
to 40 msec (smaller than the protection response time). The islanded subnetwork experience
the voltage signal shown in Fig. 5.10 (b) when the delay of control signals for DGs g4 and
g5 increases to 100 msec (larger than the protection response time). Regardless of the higher
communication delay, the SC can successfully manage DG systems and the voltage signal is
quickly restored. This result confirms that, the use of exponential cost factors in the control
problem P can effectively compensate for the delay spread of control links. Finally, Fig.
5.10 (c) shows the voltage signal in islanded subnetwork when the delays of control links
are not taken into account in the decision making problem P . It is concluded that, the SC
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Figure 5.8 The Frequency data of three nodes in scenario I [3]
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Figure 5.9 Temporary disturbance in the frequency data when the network is subject to line
fault in scenario I. (a) The mean frequency deviation, (b) The frequency disturbance counter
[3]
can maintain the balance of power after the fault clearance, although higher communication
delays result in slower voltage restoration.
It should be noted that, the reported frequency data are estimates of the actual frequency in
the islanded subnetwork, however, they are useful in evaluation of the post-fault transients.
Figs. 5.11 (a)-(c) illustrate the average values of frequency data, denoted by f¯ , in Scenario I.
The values of f¯ for the islanded subnetwork are calculated based on the following equation
[3]
f¯(k) = 1‖ Gim ‖
∑
Bim
f(k; bi), Bim = {b14, b15, b16}
A quick frequency restoration is achieved when the delays are smaller than the protection
response time, as shown in Fig. 5.11 (a). A comparison between Fig. 5.11 (b) and (c)
again confirms that the proposed decision making algorithm counteracts the negative effect
of communication delays if they surpass the protection response time. The numerical results
demonstrated in Figs. 5.10 and 5.11 corroborate the advantages of cooperation between the
local protection systems and the SC for fast and reliable voltage/frequency recovery in the
islanded subnetwork.
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Figure 5.10 The voltage waveform of phase A of observation node b16 in scenario I: (a)
τctl,1 = τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 40 msec, (b) τctl,1 = 40, τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 100 msec, with exponential cost
factors (c) τctl,1 = 40, τctl,2 = τctl,3 = 100 msec, with unity cost factors ζi = 1 [3]
5.4.5 Time-Domain Scenario II: Centralized Fault Detection
In this scenario, a line-to-ground fault occurs in the phase A of the edge (b8, b9), and the
over-current relays detect the fault at the time t = 1.242 sec. Hence, in this case, the detec-
tion time of the local protection system (242 msec) is longer than the fault tolerance time.
Therefore, the fault should be identified by the SC and the protective messages are sent to
the relays associated with the faulty edge. The detection index in this scenario is found as
kfl = 143 and the faulty edge can be identified through Eq. (5.9). Algorithm 5.1 can localize
the faulty edge by detecting the edge that exhibits the largest normalized fault current, as
shown in Fig. 5.12.
Figs. 5.13 (a) and (d) indicate that the line fault in this case yields persistent under-voltage
disturbances in the phase A. As it is clear in Figs. 5.13 (b) and (c), the healthy phases (B
and C) show positive values of mean magnitude deviation. The result shown in Fig. 5.13 (d)
reveals that the SC can detect the fault as soon as the magnitude disturbance counter, N−V,A,
equals 21 at the time t = 1.192 sec. These simulation results demonstrate that when the
local protection system is not fast enough, the proposed backup protection scheme properly
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detects the fault within the fault tolerance time .
Figs. 5.14 (a) and (b) show the voltages of phase B versus time in Scenario II. In this case, the
DG set of the islanded subnetwork is Gim = {gim,i} = {g1, ..., g5} and the delays associated
with their control links are: τctl,1 = 60 msec, τctl,2 = 80 msec, τctl,3 = 100 msec, τctl,4 = 70
msec, and τctl,5 = 120 msec. It is evident that the communication delays in control links
are larger than the response time of the protection system, which is equal to 55 msec. By
ignoring the delays of the control links the cost factors for all DG systems are unity. Hence,
the delay dispersion of links is not taken into account in decision making problem and the
post-fault voltages exhibit more distortions as shown in Fig. 5.14 (a). However, Fig. 5.14
(b) confirms that the voltage of the islanded subnetwork incurs fewer distortions by using
the exponential cost model and including the delays of control links in the problem P .
Fig. 5.15 shows the optimal post-fault apparent powers that the decision maker determined
for different DG systems in the islanded subnetwork. It is seen that, if the dispersion of
delays in control links are not taken into account, then a uniform power allocation is decided
for the the DG set Gim. In this particular case, the post-fault apparent powers of all DG
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Figure 5.12 The normalized fault currents in Scenario II: k = kfl [3]
systems are 49 kVA. By using the exponential cost factors in the decision making process
a non-uniform power allocation is obtained, which is tailored to the communications and
capacity constraints of DG systems. As shown in Fig. 5.14 (b), DG system g1 which has the
shortest communications delay generates power near its rated power. This adaptive power
allocation improves the response of the DG systems to the fault isolation event.
5.4.6 Scenario III: Fault in the Presence of Machine-Based DG Systems
In this time-domain scenario, the fault isolation and secondary control mechanisms are inves-
tigated in the presence of a machine-based DG in addition to the inverter-based DG systems.
The conventional machine-based DG is a synchronous machine with rated power of 300 kVA.
This DG system is connected to the observation node b10 via a step-up transformer with
delta-wye connections and 13.8 kV to 24.9 kV voltage ratings. The faulty segment is the edge
(b8, b9) which incurs a three-phase fault at the time instant tf = 1 sec. The communication
delays in the control links of the machine- and inverter-based DG systems are equal to 40
msec. In this scenario, if the fault tolerance time of the backup protection is 200 msec,
then the local over-current protection system detects the fault at t = 1.166 sec. Under this
circumstance, the SC receives a GOOSE message at t = 1.171 sec.
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Figure 5.13 Persistent magnitude disturbance in scenario II: (a)-(c) The mean magnitude
deviation for phases A-C, (d): The magnitude disturbance counter for phase A [3]
Fig. 5.16 (a) illustrates the voltage magnitude data versus time when the fault detection is
carried out by over-current relays. In this case, the slower response of conventional machine-
based DG system is ignored in the decision making problem. The result shown in Fig. 5.16
(a) reveal that the isolation of the fault entails post-fault voltage distortions that gradually
disappear in the presence of the conventional machine-based DG system. This poor perfor-
mance can be justified by the fact that the DG management by the SC is not tailored to the
actual post-fault DG conditions in the islanded subnetwork.
The post-fault voltage distortions can be significantly diminished by decreasing the fault
tolerance time and including the relative response time of the machine-based DG system,
as shown in Fig. 5.16 (b). In this test, the fault tolerance time is reduced to 30 msec
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Figure 5.14 The voltage waveform of phase B of observation node b13 in scenario II: (a) With
unity cost factors ζi = 1, (b) With exponential cost factors given by (5.21) [3]
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Figure 5.16 The magnitude data reported from phase A of the node b10 in Scenario III: (a)
Detection by over-current relays with tolerance time Tfl = 200 msec (b) Centralized detection
with tolerance time Tfl = 30 msec [3]
and the total control delays are calculated based on the response times of the DG systems.
The cost factors for control of inverter-based DG systems were less than the cost factor
assigned to the machine-based DG system. Fig. 5.16 (b) clearly shows that, in contrast with
over-current relays, the central fault detector isolates the fault within a short time. This
faster fault isolation allows for better response of DG systems in the islanded subnetwork.
However, the magnitude of voltage still shows small-scale distortions which emanate from
the machine-based DG system. The aforementioned results corroborate the effectiveness of
the developed approach for reliable backup protection and adaptive control of both machine-
and inverter-based DG systems.
5.5 Conclusion
The detection of line faults within the permissible fault tolerance time is one of the advanced
techniques for adaptive protection and control of smart grids. This chapter develops a new
approach for coordinated backup protection and secondary control of DG systems. A low-
complexity fault detection algorithm is proposed which identifies faults through processing of
synchrophasor datasets and communications with local relays. The proposed fault detector
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discriminates islanding events from faults and ensures fault isolation according the post-fault
stability requirements. Synchronized with the fault detector, a decision making algorithm
finds the post-fault setpoints of real/reactive powers of DG systems in the islanded subnet-
work. The response time of relays, the capacity of DG systems, and the communication
delays are taken into account in the solving the secondary control problem. The EMTP sim-
ulation results confirmed that the coordinated protection and control approach can reliably
clear different types of faults within the fault tolerance time. The proposed approach leads
to fast voltage/frequency recovery in modern distribution grids. The proposed method can
be extended to case of ADNs with responsive loads, i.e., loads equipped with controllers and
smart meters. In this context, loads are communicating with different agents so that they
can participate in voltage and frequency regulation of the network.
111
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Thesis Summary
This thesis develops synchrophasor data analytics that leverage event-triggered control and
protection applications for smart grids. The thesis paves the way for more intelligent and
resilient power systems by elaborating on disturbance/event detection based on processing of
synchrophasor datasets. It is mentioned that, advanced control and communication technolo-
gies along with renewable energy sources will be incorporated in smart grids. Moreover, syn-
chrophasor technology and its important role in data-centric control and protection schemes
are discussed. A data processing framework is introduced which is composed of three build-
ing blocks: data acquisition, data analytics, and high-level applications. Data acquisition
deals with extraction of signals, information, and behavioral messages from the components
of the grid. Different sources of information (e.g., PMUs, IEDs, smart meters, etc.) and
different types of data impairments (e.g., noise, delay, and unpredictable loss of data) are
discussed. Techniques and algorithms that analyze the acquired data are the analytics which
improve control and protection functionalities. Resource management, situational awareness,
hierarchical control, and backup protection are among the high-level applications. The main
contributions of the thesis which are related to the synchrophasor data analytics are summa-
rized as follows:
1. Reliable disturbance detection:
A new structure for centralized detection of voltage/frequency disturbances in microgrids is
developed. In this structure, the MGCC detects subtle deviations of the voltage/frequency
in both grid-connected and islanded modes. It is shown that, the MGCC can employ a local
PDC (equipped with an interpolative data concentration algorithm) in order to counteract
severe noise and data loss in communications links. The overall detection structure deals
with noisy and intermittent synchrophasor data, however, it can decrease the average detec-
tion time by exploiting the measurement diversity. The reliability of the detection structure
is evaluated in terms of the probability of false detection which may occur due to noise. In
the low and moderate SNR regions, the performance of the centralized monitoring system is
superior when compared with that of local detectors. It is shown that, false detections can
be suppressed at the cost of larger average detection time.
2. Monitoring of DG systems:
An adaptive model-based method for monitoring of DG systems detects presence and ab-
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sence of DG systems in microgrids/ADNs. By analyzing synchrophasor datasets, the MGCC
can estimate the number of operational DG systems and find the location of DG connec-
tion/disconnection events. For the main PCC, a least-square parameter estimator extracts
the model of the phasors of the CSC (time-series of Gaussian random processes). Based on
the extracted model, a monitoring algorithm evaluates the forward prediction error to detect
disconnection/connection events. The monitoring algorithm properly updates the detection
threshold based on the previously received data. Therefore, the MGCC is able to reliably
track the operational number of the microgrid over the time. Random fluctuations of PV
sources along with sudden load changes can reduce the efficiency of the DG monitoring. DS
units can smooth the fluctuations in solar energy and thus leverage the performance of the
DG monitoring. By deploying more PMUs in the network, local synchrophasor datasets are
reported to the MGCC. The data outliers that stem from DG events are detectable by means
of the LOP method and the local datasets. The location of the DG events is identified by
finding the maximum LOP among different local datasets.
3. Coordinated protection and control:
An approach for coordinated backup protection and secondary control of DG systems is de-
veloped. A low-complexity fault detection algorithm identifies line faults by processing of
synchrophasor datasets and communications with local relays. The fault detector distin-
guishes between faults and islanding events by simultaneous monitoring of frequency and
voltage data. The fault detector in conjunction with the DG monitoring unit ensure that
the post-fault stability requirements are met. A decision making algorithm determines the
post-fault reference points of real/reactive powers of DG systems in the islanded portion of
the network. The response time of protective devices, the capacity of DG systems, and the
communication delays are taken into account in the decision making process. This synergy
of backup protection and secondary control leads to fast recovery of voltage/frequency in
smart distribution grids.
The analytical algorithms and mechanisms presented in this thesis aid researchers and engi-
neers in developing intelligent control and protection systems for smart grids. In particular,
secondary and tertiary control of microgrids, adaptive and backup protection, and online
resource management are directly empowered by the synchrophasor data analytics. The
computer simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed methods for real-life
scenarios. Finally, the thesis, given its cross-disciplinary contributions serves as an initial
step towards advanced grid technologies.
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6.2 List of Publications
The research outcomes of this PhD project are as follows:
1) Younes Seyedi, Houshang Karimi, and Josep M. Guerrero, “Centralized disturbance detec-
tion in smart microgrids with noisy and intermittent synchrophasor data,” IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid, Early Access, DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2016.2539947
2) Younes Seyedi, Houshang Karimi, and Santiago Grijalva, “Distributed generation moni-
toring for hierarchical control applications in smart microgrids,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 2305-2314, May 2017
3) Younes Seyedi, and Houshang Karimi, “Coordinated protection and control based on syn-
chrophasor data processing in smart distribution networks,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, Early Access, DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2017.2708662
4) Reza Pourramezan, Younes Seyedi, Houshang Karimi, Guchuan Zhu, and Michel Mont-
Briant, “Design of an Advanced Phasor Data Concentrator for Monitoring of Distributed
Energy Resources in Smart Microgrids,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, Early
Access, DOI: 10.1109/TII.2017.2697438
5) Younes Seyedi, and Houshang Karimi, “Design of networked protection systems for smart
distribution grids: A data-driven approach,” IEEE PES General Meeting, July 2017, Chicago,
IL, USA, Accepted
6) Younes Seyedi, Houshang Karimi, and Santiago Grijalva “A new probabilistic approach for
localization of distributed generation events in active distribution networks,” In preparation
6.3 Future Works
This research opens a window into state-of-the-art topics that can be pursued in future stud-
ies. Some of the related topics are suggested and briefly described below:
1. Integrated simulation platform for smart grid:
Conventional power system components can be accurately modeled and analyzed by sophis-
ticated software and real-time simulators. However, incorporation of synchrophasor networks
and advanced metering devices into the grid requires integrated simulation methodologies.
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An integrated simulation platform can significantly facilitate analysis and testing of intelligent
control and protection applications. new simulation approaches should be developed which
account for the interactions between power systems components and synchrophasor networks.
2. Networked protection systems:
Hierarchical and backup protection systems essentially operate based on the exchange of
signals, data, and protective messages. If these systems rely on shared communication media,
then they may suffer from challenges and issues regarding reliability. In particular, loss of
data due to communication/device failure and loss of synchronization due to time delays.
Networked protection systems should be designed in order to overcome the aforementioned
issues. New mechanisms must be developed to ensure robustness of the communication-
based protection schemes. Networked protection systems rely on communication systems to
improve protection capabilities.
If a dedicated communication medium is employed for control and protection systems, then
deterministic QoS can be achieved. However, there are different types of technologies which
can be used for networked protection applications such as optical communications, wireless
LANs, cellular networks and power line communications. Further studies are still needed for
the qualified choice of communication technology. The required QoS and the cost should also
be assessed to ensure a high level of performance while minimizing the cost.
3. Data security in smart grid:
Smart grids belong to the broader class of cyber-physical systems where computer-based
algorithms are tightly integrated with data networks and physical systems. As discussed in
this thesis, analytics, decision making, and event detection are important features of smart
power systems. In view of the above facts, data security is of crucial importance for the
power grid safety and reliability. For instance, new approaches are necessary for detection of
malicious attacks on synchrophasor data streams. These attacks may inject misleading infor-
mation into synchrophasor networks. Therefore, PMUs and PDCs should employ screening
and validation algorithms in order to discard illegitimate data and prevent them from reach-
ing control and protection applications.
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